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**A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE
SĀNKHYA SYSTEM**
**ON THE LINE OF THE SĀNKHYA-KĀRIKĀ,
SĀNKHYA-SŪTRA AND THEIR COMMENTARIES**
(*being the research paper submitted to the University
of Allahabad with the addition of an English and
Sanskrit introduction and the texts of the
Sāṅkhyā-Kārikā and the
Sāṅkhyā Sūtra.*)

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PREFACE

The author of a new book on the Sāṅkhya philosophy owes an explanation to his readers. Since there are already a few books in English, exclusively devoted to the Sāṅkhya and some others covering the whole field of Indian Philosophy, each containing a chapter on the Sāṅkhya, it may be demanded, why inflict another? My answer is simple. The present work is not altogether a new attempt but the reprint of my paper on the Sāṅkhya, prepared under the wise and able guidance of Pañdit (now Dr.) Umeśa Miśra, and published five years ago in the *Allahabad University Studies*, Arts section, Volume VII, pp. 387-432, while I was a Research Scholar in the Department of Sanskrit of the University of Allahabad. Then again, this booklet is not meant to replace the existing works but to supplement them, if the humble effort of a beginner, with very little pretensions to originality, can aspire to such a claim. This reprint has afforded me an opportunity to add introductions in English and Sanskṛt and the texts of the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra and the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā.

It is not a detailed critical study of the Sāṅkhya based on an exhaustive study of all the available original materials, but is a brief treatment of a select and compact group of facts on broad lines. I flatter myself that it will serve as a handy volume to Oriental scholars and University students; but those, who relegate the Sanskṛt texts to the back-ground and want the English exposition only, will not find much in it to meet their requirements. References to sources have been given in the foot-notes in the case of important points only.

My thanks are due to Principal T. L. H. Smith-Pearse, I.E.S., for kindly having gone through the manuscript of the English Introduction, to Dr. J. Sinha, M.A., Ph.D., P.R.S., Professor of Philosophy, Meerut College, for associating himself with this book and to some of my colleagues for some helpful suggestions.

Raipur : April 1, 1935.

V. V. S.

ASSOCIATION

I feel immense pleasure in associating myself with the valuable and scholarly work of Mr. V. V. Sovani, M.A., with whom I have been intimately connected for many years by the closest ties of affection. He is a distinguished graduate of our College and the Agra University. He was inspired with genuine love for Sanskrit literature and philosophy by his father, late Prof. V. V. Sovani, M.A., of Meerut College and Allahabad University, who was well-known in Northern India for his profound scholarship in Sanskritic studies. Mr. V. V. Sovani wrote his "*A Critical Study of the Sāṅkhya System*" as a Research Scholar of the Allahabad University, which was published in the *Allahabad University Studies*, Vol. VII., in 1931. He has laid us under a deep debt of gratitude by publishing the abstract in the form of a book which will be easily accessible to all interested in the subject. His work with its historical introduction and highly suggestive, critical analysis of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā with its commentaries and a comparative estimate of their interpretations will be a valuable guide and a useful book of reference to all students of Indian philosophy. The book, fully worked out, with English translations of the Kārikās and important portions of the commentaries, will be a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject.

Meerut :
April 1, 1935.

Jadunath Sinha.

INTRODUCTION

A critical treatment of the Sāṅkhya has been essayed in the body of the book. The occasion is here taken to discuss a few broad principles and to present some thought-provoking ideas, but I have attempted only to suggest, not to dilate.

Religion and philosophy will always have an important place in ennobling the life of man. Science¹ cannot replace them. It is in the nature of too many men to crave for something that the mind cannot grasp and which is beyond the powers of exact sciences to explain. The modern increasingly scientific world has not yet been able to solve much of the riddle², and whatever comparatively few conclusions science has reached are liable to be reversed any moment. Who could expect that many of the Newtonian theories of

1. "The tendency to-day is not to reduce everything to manifestations of matter—since matter now has only a minor place in the physical world—but to reduce it to manifestations of the operation of natural law", and concludes "... Dismiss the idea that natural law may swallow up religion; it cannot even tackle the multiplication table single-handed."—Prof. Eddington, as quoted by Ramanand Chatterji in the *Malaviya Commemoration Volume*.

2. "...The ethers and their undulations, the waves which form the universe, are in all probability fictitious. This is not to say that they have no existence at all: they exist in our minds, or we should not be discussing them; and something must exist outside our minds to put this or any other concept into our minds. To this something we may assign the name reality, and it is this reality which it is the object of science to study."—Sir James Jeans in *Mysterious Universe*.

Mathematics and Physics would be overthrown by Einstein's theory of Relativity? "An apple is attracted by the earth when it falls" was said by Newton. In the popular language, Einstein would probably now say, "The earth moves up to receive the apple". A molecule was regarded as unbreakable. Later on atom was supposed to be an unanalysable entity but now that too is supposed to be made of electrons and protons. In simple language, energy is supposed to be evolving matter, a statement which the scientists were not ready to accept in the past. Consider also the example of the Elements. More than 96 have been found out and he who knows the Electronic theory may some day reduce the number to Unity. Surely a start has been made by transmutation of lead into gold and Hydrogen into Helium. If it is possible to get one from the other, it may be possible some day to get All from One.

The influence of the West and new scientific theories and inventions have helped to change the outward aspect of India but the inner spiritual aspect of the country has not changed much. There is no achievement in the world which can compare favourably with that of Indian speculative philosophy ranging from the half-inarticulate beginnings in the Vedas to the logical realism of Nyāya and the ethical idealism of Buddhism. An attempt has been made in the following paragraphs to show the unity and continuity of Indian thought and its close relation to life and religion from the dim dawn of history.

The Aryans of the Vedic period were an energetic race, ever ready to act and to fight, taking pleasure in life and work, ready to enjoy the good things which life offered, manfully struggling against difficulties.

and dangers. They seem never to have doubted that, inspite of its ills, life is, on the whole, a good thing, and they cherished the faith that after death brave and good men go to "Elysian fields" where, through the favour of the Gods, they enjoy everlasting bliss.

But, gradually, the spirit and belief of the people underwent a profound change. The old simple joy in life and delight in action passed away, and the view began to be held that life is not a good thing at all, that its ills and sufferings are greater than its joys and pleasures. Death was no longer viewed as a gate to a happier state of existence, but as the transition into other states, all of which are full of sorrow. Great teachers arose, who taught that, strive as he may, man can secure no permanent happiness; that life indeed is nothing but pain; that death will begin only another round of painful existence. The old Aryans, in short, had held that life, with all its troubles, problems and perplexities, is a good thing to be enjoyed; the later Hindus were inclined to the view that, for the virtuous and sinful alike, all lives are pain and sorrow. With their minds less fixed on the needs and joys of the day, these thinkers found leisure also to ponder on the world and on human life. They began to think that the way to true happiness lay not in doing and enjoying, but in the bliss of inward meditation, and that such meditation could best be carried on in the solitude of forests, apart from the noisy haunts of men.

When, in that little known remote period, the theory that man was crushed with the burden of threefold pain, took shape, and when the popular religion of the period failed to solve the difficulty except by showing a way to temporary escape from the pain and sorrow of existence, the great sages and thinkers turned their

attention to the investigation of the origin of pain. In the actual process of investigation they were faced with perplexing anomalies and imperfections in the Creation and were painfully conscious of the limitations of their powers. They did not hold any divine agency responsible for this. The origin of pain, they said, was the effect of causes, of deeds done, either in this or in a past life. Then there arose a new question, whether it was possible for man to put an end to the seemingly unbroken and irresistible sequence of the effects of deeds, and whether the cycle of life and death must go on for ever.

All action in the world is brought about by desire, which is based on innate ignorance which makes a man fail to recognise the true nature of things and ultimately causes transmigration. The darkness of such ignorance is dispelled by divine knowledge, which, according to every philosophical school, consists of *tattva-jñāna*. Universal knowledge, when attained, destroys the effect of Karma, which would otherwise result in a future existence, and thus puts an end to transmigration, or in other words, brings salvation.

How can man know himself and attain *tattva-jñāna* to annihilate the effects of Karma? Here we arrive at the parting of the ways. The peculiar bent of the Hindu mind, illustrated in the principal philosophical and religious systems of India, diverse though they are, has the special feature that it tends to and aims at pacification of the mind and thus hopes to get rid of the sufferings of the worldly existence. The different systems only prescribe different methods. As our present work is a critical study of the central features of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, we shall henceforward confine our remarks mainly to the Sāṅkhya, the pioneer

amongst the systems, which adumbrated the view that this body is subject to decay and death, and with it will end all bodily sufferings. The ego behind the body is a creation of environments and circumstances and will disappear also. What remains behind the body and behind the ego is called in the Sāṅkhya 'Prakṛti'. Puruṣa is that which is perfect, independent and completely aloof from everything else. A true knowledge² of Puruṣa and its relation to Prakṛti will help a man to rid himself of the threefold pain once and for all and such a man will not be born again.

In their first attempts to unfold the origin of the world, the thinkers thought of a crude mass of matter alone, and were later on forced to admit, either inside or outside of it, a power to account for the order visible everywhere on closer observation. It must have been possible only after ages to reduce matter to a very subordinate place as in Saṅkara's Vedānta or in Buddhism. So the Sāṅkhya views can safely claim:

3. "Nor is the Sāṅkhya doctrine of many selves and nature any more tenable as a theory of Creation. How can disturbances of Prakṛti take place at a first creation, when there are no potencies due to man's actions demanding fruition? Even at subsequent creations, how do latent potentialities by themselves become fruitful without any consciousness to direct them? And, if they do attain fruition, the Sāṅkhya theory of liberation by knowledge is without value, since the potencies will remain able to come again in activity. Knowledge can never give freedom from bondage, which can be attained only by the exhaustion of action, for which the Sāṅkhya metaphysics affords no adequate possibility, owing to the infinite potentialities of nature."—Keith in *Karmamimānsā*, p. 64, following Kumārila's view.

priority to others. It is possible that in the beginning the Sāṅkhyas postulated Prakṛti alone and gradually so perfected it as to explain the whole Universe. A man while immersed in Sāṅkhya thought, is practically led to accept that unaided Prakṛti can do everything—evolution or dissolution. Evolution seems to be in its nature. Only when the stage is reached of accounting for the subjective side of evolution—mind, sense and motor organs—and of searching out a seer to make the manifestations purposeful, does he look out for Puruṣa and its place in the scheme, and slowly he finds not only one but many of them, and is perplexed to discover that even all of them with their characteristic indifference to Prakṛti are not enough to satisfy the critics' whims about a well-reasoned system of thought.

The nature of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and their relationship—the crux of the whole doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas—has been subject to much criticism. There are flaws in this dualistic system no doubt, but were the other systems of Indian Philosophy free from defects? Puruṣas are many and Prakṛti is eternal. Was the substantiality of Prakṛti not enough for the purposes of the Sāṅkhyas? Why did they strive to turn it into an ultimate reality? Having done so, why did they not proceed beyond the separate infallibility of Prakṛti to a unified infallibility with a singular Puruṣa? Other-

4. "It is my opinion that systems which play the game of philosophy squarely and fairly with freedom from pre-suppositions and religious neutrality, naturally end in absolute idealism; and if they lead to other conclusions, we may always suspect that the game has not been played according to the rules."—Radhakrishnan in preface to *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*.

wise, how could Prakṛti ever hope to undertake the unparalleled philanthropic task of labouring unceasingly for the permanent release of Puruṣa, if one is the negation of everything that the other stands for? Where was the necessity of supposing the ultimate plurality of Puruṣa, when the reasons for such a supposition are entirely worldly, such as bondage and release of individuals? The Puruṣa is always absolutely unaffected by the influence of Prakṛti. Then how can we distinguish one Absolute Puruṣa from his kindred? Does not such plurality imply introducing limitations in Him?

Was the plurality of Puruṣa a concession to the vanity of man? Was the merging of his soul into one undifferentiated Puruṣa a poor consolation? Does it make the Sāṅkhya more attractive? Did Satkāryavāda stand in the way of a single Puruṣa, because one Prakṛti is three Guṇas and their varied combinations⁵ could bring the whole creation into existence, whereas one Puruṣa could not boast of any such power? How could he account for the numberless individuals in the animate world? Were countless Purusas supplied to fill the whole universe, so that, later on, no difficulty be felt to start and keep the world evolving?

5. A concrete illustration of the enormous possibility of combinations from a very simple mechanism, lock and key :- " Each tumbler step of a large Chubb key can be given one of thirty different heights, the bolt step one of twenty. By merely transposing the order of the steps in a six step key it is possible to get 720 combinations. By diminishing or increasing the heights, the possible combinations may be raised to the enormous total of 7,776,000 ".—A. Williams in *How It Works*, pp 435-6.

Many are the objections raised. To mention a few : How are Purusas many and Prakṛti eternal? How can they come together? How can the evolutes combine in themselves the cosmic and the psychological? How can the original harmonious balance of Guṇas be disturbed? Are the tangible things of the world no more than Guṇas in conflict? Probably Prakṛti alone, in the opinion of these critics, would have been more successful in explaining the scheme than Prakṛti with an addition of innumerable Purusas. The absolute unattachment of Purusas is considered a definite hindrance rather than a solution.

If the problem of problems—the Purusas' evolution starting propinquity to Prakṛti—is solved, much of the criticism can be silenced, they say.

But where is the problem to necessitate a remedy? Why is it thought necessary that they are to be brought together and then a way of its accomplishment searched? Are Puruṣa and Prakṛti not all-pervading and are they not, then, blended everywhere with each other like warp and woof? Evolution under such circumstances will be unending. Whatever the texts may say, the released Puruṣa remains where he was and what he was, with the difference that Prakṛti ceases to affect him. The release brings no change in prakṛti also, because, though it affects the released no more, it unceasingly continues its attractions for the unreleased, who will always be in a vast majority. In short, everything continues to be what it was and where it was. Prakṛti ceases its attraction for the released—this statement lays emphasis only on the discriminating knowledge which makes the Purusa's standing aloof possible, and not on the cessation of activity in Prakṛti with regard even to the released.

Throughout the different periods the leaders of Indian thought never lost sight of the psychological basis of metaphysics. Rejecting phenomenism, the Vedānta reaches the greatest heights the Indian mind has ever attained, when evolving a formula to explain the phenomenon of consciousness. The Sāṅkhya blundered. In attempting to solve one difficulty, it created another. It tried to reconcile the philosophical and the mundane and, in the process, miserably failed over the former. Contradictions have crept in because of this failure; the whole argument has been shaken and people have been led to think that the Sāṅkhya propounders were no better than blind teachers leading the blind. Shortcomings may be concealed by various kinds of special pleading, but the inconsistencies cannot escape the critic's eye.

Thought-systems are contributory, and their combined message boils down to unity. Time and space are unending quantitatively but not qualitatively. Every individual thing in the world comes into being and disappears, and time and space, as applied to it, are unending; but if the world is viewed devoid of time and space, it becomes homogeneous. So the world is transitory distributively but not collectively. Prakṛti contains the opposing constituents, Sattva and Tamas, yet they are reconciled by Rajas. So Guṇas both create divisions and differences and maintain unity also. So the activities of the world form, as it were, one broad stream, but superficialities, caused by the predominance of one Guṇa or the other, lead men to think there are several separate channels each small enough to make human knowledge of it possible. The Sāṅkhya for these reasons is dualistic, with Prakṛti and Puruṣa as co-eternal. But they are different from

each other and neither of them is a cause or effect of the other. Without the help of the Sāṅkhya, the world cannot be properly known, and as the unworldly can be studied only through the worldly, the Sāṅkhya has been given an important place by most of the systems. Without the many, there is not the one, and without differences there is not the uniform; and therefore, true knowledge implies seeing one in many and many in one, and seeing uniformity in diversity and diversity in uniformity. If dualism is deficient without the acceptance of one absolute being over and above Puruṣa and Prakṛti, which inspite of Him persist and prove their existence by their opposing natures, monism alone is not self-sufficient also. Monism through dualism is just and proper; but the Vedānta monism, with Māyā to explain the world, is unjust and improper. Similarly, the two ways to salvation are—to retain activity but to abandon its fruit; and to abandon the fruit as well as the action. The former, that is, objectless activity, means the substitution of major for minor desires, of collective for individual good, of soul-care for bodily care. Sāṅkhya sanyāsis who abandon the prescribed duty are in the wrong, because instead of foregoing the fruit they forego duty itself.⁶ Sanyāsa is self-centred, while Karma-yoga is community-centred. The latter's outlook is broad because it procures a man's own good, through that of the community.

6. "A result of the combined doctrine of transmigration and karma is that it paralyses action, drives to asceticism, and makes action self-regarding, since it becomes the aim of every man to win salvation for himself individually by acquiring the right knowledge".—Macdonnell in *Comparative Religion*.

The exposition and justification of the Sāṅkhyā theories follow. So far, the reader has been prepared for the right perspective in which to judge them. Considering the interdependence of different thought-systems, a man concludes, that there is no reason for followers of one system to think compelled to pick quarrels with others, and holes in their system. So common a practice leads them to absurd exaggeration of the importance of their own tenets and depreciation of those of others. It leads them also to claim their system as complete and flawless for all and at all times ; and to deny any truth in others. But in this variegated world no one system can boast to supply the needs of all individuals. One system suits some, and another suits others. A greater and greater realisation of this truth will keep each system within its limits and promote co-operation between all. Each has something to teach and something to learn.

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SĀNKHYA SYSTEM ON THE LINE OF THE SĀNKHYA- KĀRIKĀ, SĀNKHYA-SŪTRA AND THEIR COMMENTARIES

The aim of the paper is to give a clear-cut exposition of the Sāṅkhya in its more developed form. Such explanation is intended to reconcile the many surface irregularities, seeming incongruities and superficial inconsistencies, which usually strike the casual reader and critic. Such misconceptions are not the lot of the unwary and the uninitiated only. All have with one voice deprecated this or the other aspect of the system. In view of its general misunderstanding by all and sundry, a new treatment of the subject will not be out of place.

A perfect thought-system should naturally grow out of its initial fundamental postulates, which do not require recurring subsequent reinforcements to account for all its developments. An attempt is made below to show that the Sāṅkhya does satisfy these requirements and that there is really no justification for the clamour which is usually raised against it.

There are two broad aspects of the Sāṅkhya which must be clearly distinguished in the present study; one is the Sāṅkhya before Iṣvarakṛṣṇa's kārikā and the other is the Sāṅkhya after kārikā. There are undoubtedly many more types of the Sāṅkhya besides those which we shall have occasion to touch upon in course of the brief survey of the history of the Sāṅkhya. This review is necessary for a fuller insight into the meaning of the kārikā terminology and the development of the kārikā conceptions. The above divisions into pre-kārikā, kārikā and post-kārikā

Sāṅkhya are not intended to represent water-tight compartments without overlappings. The basis of classification in the three groups will be similarity of tenets and not mere chronological sequence. The consensus of opinion is that the pre-kārikā Sāṅkhya marks an embryonic state and that the post-kārikā a state of deterioration from the settled form in the kārikā. The pre-kārikā Sāṅkhya is vague and no complete book on the subject is extant. The few references we have are to be met with in unexpected, out-of-the-way contexts and these too are often found indifferently mixed up with other heterogeneous material. In dealing with this topic, therefore, emphasis will be laid only on facts that have in any way contributed to the shaping of the classical Sāṅkhya.

The Sāṅkhya is one of the oldest systems¹ of thought and we find it already prominent at the threshold of philosophical enquiry. The pre-kārikā Sāṅkhya is the characteristic product of an India newly stirred to its depths by the impulses of creative philosophical activity. In this period, the great systems of Indian thought have their fountain-heads. These springs were to remain, however, for long, mere rills and rivulets of negligible magnitude, till in the period of the Upaniṣads we have them swelling into a mighty boisterous current, and this in its turn was to split up and settle down finally into the six familiar channels of Indian philosophy which have watered through centuries this ancient land. The pre-kārikā

¹ 'System' in this context does not imply that the Sāṅkhya had from the very beginning a well-planned scheme with some definite author to its credit, or that its tenets had taken their final shape.

Sāṅkhyā, in the meanwhile, may be considered a notable legacy of the early thinkers.

The word Sāṅkhyā first appears in the Sāntiparva of the Mahābhārata; and Sāṅkhyā and Yoga in that book have been referred to as 'sanātane dve.' Sāṅkhyā at times stands for knowledge only and in that sense it has to be distinguished from the Sāṅkhyā, which is the name for a particular system. Sāṅkhyā standing for the system should not be derived to mean 'number' because enumeration is not a characteristic feature of the Sāṅkhyā. Other Indian systems far surpass it in this respect. The natural and traditionally accepted interpretation is from Sāṅkhyā—*buddhi* or knowledge. The term Sāṅkhyā was earmarked after a time for the particular system which believed in liberation through true knowledge of the difference of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Jacobi refers to *parisaṅkhyā* and distinguishes the practice of the Sāṅkhyas, who, when explaining the significance of a conception, give an exhaustive enumeration of things contained, from that of the Vaiśeṣikas, who give the *vis'esa*s or distinctive qualities. Guṇaratna¹ holds that the Sāṅkhyā derived its name from its first founder, Saṅkha.

The Sāṅkhyā was ignored, it is often said, on account of its atheistic tendencies. This argument as it stands is not correct. The Sāṅkhyā was classed amongst the orthodox systems and therefore it always ranked higher than the monistic philosophy of Śaṅkara in which everything was reduced to non-entity except Brahman, or than the deistic Vaiṣṇavaite and Śaivaite doctrines. The acceptance of the authority of the

¹ In his commentary on Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 22, Bibliotheca Ed.

scripture may have been a device on the part of the Sāṅkhyas, but it was successfully carried and they enjoyed all the advantages of an orthodox system without losing their own characteristic of maintaining the system purely rationalistic. To allow free thinking, they are said to have denied the existence of God, which would hamper the progress of pure reasoning in ignorant minds. But the reason was otherwise. There was no place left for Him in the system, and Indian thinkers and Indian followers were bold enough to carry their conclusions to the logical ends, however horrifying the results may be to the popular mind, or they did not remain horrifying because they were logical.

Besides, the Sāṅkhya has not openly rejected the authority of the Vedas. It has definitely accepted the śrutiप्रमाण as one of the pramāṇas, though śruti has a wider sense in the Sāṅkhya, meaning correct tradition or authoritative statement. The Sāṅkhya-Sūtra has a penchant for referring to śruti for validity. But judged otherwise, the Sāṅkhya has relegated अनुसरण methods in the removal of misery to a secondary place, though they are called प्रस'स्या, in comparison to the Sāṅkhya method which is स'र्वयान्. Śaṅkara and other commentators of his type have questioned the Sāṅkhya interpretation of some śruti texts quoted for authenticity.

The Sāṅkhya is traced back to as early a text as the Ṛgveda, the hymns X, 221 and 129 of which give an idea of the creation of the world remotely resembling the series of Sāṅkhya evolution. References are made also to Atharvaveda, X, 8 and 43, which mention the lotus flower of nine doors, covered with three strands, and to Śatapatha and Sāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇas in which Ātman is called the twenty-fifth principle. But these point to the critics' ingenuity. The Sāṅkhya,

or rather no philosophical system, can be easily traced from the Vedas. They were most likely composed when the Aryans were afraid of the natural surroundings of a newly discovered country and their thoughts were taken up in remedying the immediate evil and so they had no leisure to indulge in philosophical inquiry. But there is no denying the fact that the Sāṅkhyā had its origin in the Upaniṣadic literature, from which it slowly branched off into separate existence.

The crude materials from which the Sāṅkhyā grew as a well-knit system of philosophy are strewn in great abundance over the whole Upaniṣadic literature, though they were arranged later under the Sāṅkhyā. For that reason it is repeatedly urged by Western scholars that the Brahma-Sūtras of Bādarāyana, which are a *samanvaya* form of the Upaniṣadic philosophy, truly mean what Rāmānuja represents and not what Śaṅkara superimposes. The crowning theory of the Upaniṣads is not pure dualism, but it is not unqualified monism also. It is preferably qualified dualism. They represent a period of great activity and Śaṅkara's theory of Māyā and its later developments had no chance of finding a place in them.

Kapila³ is considered the author of the Sāṅkhyā-Sūtras as well as the first teacher of the Sāṅkhyā. One Kapila cannot be both, because it is generally believed that the Sāṅkhyā-Sūtras were compiled about the 14th century A.D.⁴ He is not a historical person. His

³ Aḥirbudhnya Saṃhitā says that his theory was Vaiṣṇava and Vijñāna-Bhikṣu has also emphasised the theistic character of the Sāṅkhyā-Sūtra.

⁴ Not later than Sarvadarśanasamgraha because one sūtra is quoted by Mādhyavāntrin, who is a contemporary of Mādhyavārya.—‘Sources of Vijayanagara Hist.,’ p. 51 and J. O. R., Madras, 1928, p. 148.

name occurs in various contexts and somehow it came to be associated with the Sāṅkhyas. He was known as a *siddha* in the literature of the Nāthas and in the *rasāya-naśāstra*.⁶ In the *Bhagavadgitā*, he is referred to as the best of *siddhas*. His case is classed in that of *janmasiddhi*. The assumption of *nirmāṇakāya* in Vyāsa's commentary on *Yoga-Sūtra*, 1. 25, attributed by Vācaspati to Pañcaśikha, implies that the Master had no physical body. He appears in *Svetāśvatara*, 5. 2, as identical with Hiranyagarbha. In the epic he is identified with Agni, with Viṣṇu and Śiva, and all sorts of views are attributed to him, and he is the teacher of a number of sages. Śaṅkara refutes the argument that Kapila of the Vedic texts was any great personage and identifies him with the Kapila who burnt the sons of Sagara. Buddhist legends mention him as a predecessor of Buddha.⁸

Kārikā 70 places Āsuri next to Kapila. Āsuri and Pañcaśikha are mentioned in *Mahābhārata* (12. 219) as teacher and pupil, from which is picked up the statement of the Kārikā. The Sāṅkhyas have an 'unbroken tradition from the time of Pañcaśikha'⁷ as indicated by *s'isya-paramparayāgatam* in Kārikā 71. He is considered to be the author of the first regular book on the subject and in that light, Bālarāma, while interpreting *samākh-yātām* in Kārikā 69, says that the word means that Kapila only harangued and did not compile any book, the task being left to Pañcaśikha. In the *Mahābhārata*, Janaka professes himself to be a disciple of the beggar Pañcaśikha, belonging to the family of Parāśara. *Mahābhārata* and *Yogabhāṣya* present different accounts.

⁶ *Vide* the Introduction of *Jayamāṅgalā* by Pandit Gopinātha Kaviraj. ⁷ Compare *Brahmajālasūtra*.

⁸ Assigned to first century A.D.

of Pañcaśikha's philosophical position. Mahābhārata itself has two separate views attributed to him in 12.321 and 96—112. His views in 12.219 do not correspond with the Sāṅkhyā. He there holds *bala* as the sixth organ with reference to organs of action as *manas* is the sixth organ in relation with the organs of perception. His views correspond more with the Vedānta, where the separate existences of the individual souls finally merge into Brahman. He is considered the author of *Saṣṭitantra* in Chinese tradition,⁸ and *Svapneśvara* in *Kaumudīprabhā* assigns Sāṅkhyā-Pravacana-Sūtra to him. Vācaspati identifies certain passages in Vyāsa's commentary on *Yoga-Sūtra* as his and they reappear in his name in the Sāṅkhyā-Sūtra. From these extracts it can be said that his work must have been in prose. His views are more logical—that the souls are atomic in size, otherwise they could not be infinite in number; that the eternal connection of spirit is due to lack of discrimination⁹ and not to works or to psychic body. Buddhist texts mention a *Gandhabba* Pañcaśikha.¹⁰

The Chinese Sāṅkhyā-Kārikā mentions Gārgya and Ulūka as Sāṅkhyā teachers. In *Buddhacarita*, Arāḍakalāma refers to Jaigīśavya, Janaka and Parāśara as persons who obtained liberation through the Sāṅkhyā.

⁸ Compare Jayamaṅgalā. ⁹ Cf. Sāṅkhyā-Sūtra, 6. 68.

¹⁰ Asuri and Pañcaśikha adhere to a theistic Sāṅkhyā that resembles the Sāṅkhyā in the Mahābhārata.—Radhakrishnan. Pañcaśikha agrees with Caraka. Caraka excludes Puruṣa from the list of tattvas and Cakrapāṇi thinks that Prakṛti and Puruṣa both being unmanifested have been counted as one; Tanmātrās are not mentioned and senses are bhautika.—Dasgupta, 'Hist. of Ind. Phil.', p. 213. Pañcaśikha probably modified Kapila's work in atheistic light as shown by 'tena bahudhū kṛtam tantram' in Kārikā 70.

Kārikā 72 declares that the subject-matter of the Saptati is based on Śaśitantra with the exclusion of ākhyāyikā and paravāda. The Kārikā is perhaps a later interpolation because the Saptati ended at Kārikā 69 where Gaudapādabhāṣya finishes.¹¹ Does Śaśitantra represent a work? The commentators do not touch the point. They differently enumerate the sixty topics that cover the whole Sāṅkhyā and that have been successfully incorporated in the body of the Saptati. Vācaspati quotes Rājavārtika, which is in *anuṣṭubha* metre for their enumeration while Jayamaṅgalā repeats the same in *upajāti*. Paramārtha also quotes the same. The ten *maulikārthas*, according to others, represent the common or individual qualities of the *tattvas*, but Nārāyaṇa represents by them the twenty-five *tattvas* themselves, though their classification is strange—(1) *puruṣa*, (2) *prakṛti*, (3) *buddhi*, (4) *ahaṅkāra*, (5-7) three *guṇas*, (8) *tanmātrā*, (9) *indriya*, and (10) *bhūta*. Ahir-budhnya-Samhitā takes Śaśitantra for a book having two *mandalas* of 32 *prakṛtis* and 28 *vikṛtis*. Chinese tradition refers to a Śaśitantra of 60,000 verses and this can be a misinterpretation of *bahudhā kṛtam tantram*, as denoting that an extensive book was composed. There is the possibility according to Schrader of two Śaśitantras—one in prose, the other in verse.¹²

¹¹ See ahead, note on Kārikā 70.

¹² Vācaspati Miśra in Bhāmatī attributes Śaśitantra to Vāṛṣaganya, which can be supported by the Chinese tradition which ascribes Vindhya-vāsa who is identified with Iśvarakṛṣṇa with rewriting of Vṛṣaganya's work; but if Vāṛṣaganya is the teacher of Vindhya-vāsa and Śaśitantra is attributed to him, it is not probable that so late a work should have been the basis of the Kārikā. But there is a doubt as to the identification of Vindhya-vāsa with Iśvarakṛṣṇa.

Max Müller elevates the *Tattvasamāsa* to the pedestal of the basis of all later Sāṅkhya works. His arguments are that it is more popular amongst the pāṇḍitas than the Kārikā; that it is a bare enumeration of principles and has many technical terms that are not met with in later works. For these very reasons Keith and Garbe assign it a later date.¹³ The very name suggests that it is an abridgment of some bigger work. The mention of *duḥkha* looks like a device for novelty; and the acceptance of *devatās* over *indriyas* and *bhūtas* shows the influence of later Vedānta.

The appearance of Iśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā¹⁴ removes a period of uncertainty¹⁵ because it provides a clear and definite exposition of the Sāṅkhya to this day. It has been the basis of all later Sāṅkhya treatises and criticisms. The date of Iśvarakṛṣṇa¹⁶ is to be determined by Chinese sources. Paramārtha left India in 546 A.D. and translated a work which resembles the Kārikā and a commentary on it in his last period of literary activity which falls in 557–568 A.D. Another

¹³ Older than seventh century A.D., because it is referred to in *Bhagavadajukiyam* and in Māmapur inscriptions—J. O. R., Madras, 1928, p. 145.

¹⁴ The Maṇimekhalai account of the Sāṅkhya, a Tamil work, which has been assigned a date earlier than that of the Kārikā differs in many respects from the Kārikā.—J. of Ind. Hist., Dec. 1929.

¹⁵ Dasgupta divides the Sāṅkhya into three strata—(a) theistic, details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form in Pātañjaladarśana; (2) atheistic, represented by Pañcaśikha; (3) atheistic modification as the orthodox Sāṅkhya system.

¹⁶ Svacneśvara identifies him with Kālidāsa.

Chinese tradition is that Vindhya-vāsa,¹⁷ who is sometimes identified with Iśvarakṛṣṇa, comes before Vasubandhu. The date of Vasubandhu was placed in the last three-quarters of the 5th century, but it has been pushed back by N. Peri a century earlier and further pushed by V. A. Smith to 280–360 A.D. Therefore, Iśvarakṛṣṇa cannot be placed in the 4th century as Keith¹⁸ does. Dr. Belvalkar thinks that Vindhya-vāsa wrote a commentary on the Kārikā. He places Iśvarakṛṣṇa in the first century A.D. or the 1st half of the 2nd century. According to him Mātharavṛtti is the basis of the Chinese translation and Iśvarakṛṣṇa must be at least two centuries earlier than Māthara because his Vṛtti is confused and it often misinterprets the Kārikā. But how can Dr. Belvalkar reach his date? He cannot utilize the date of Vasubandhu and he must depend on the translation by Paramārtha of the Kārikā and Mātharavṛtti that appears in 557–568 for his evidence. Therefore, his date is entirely based on the confused nature of the Vṛtti and the time it must have taken to become so popular as to be picked up by Paramārtha for translation. But why allow that time? Paramārtha may not have had another recourse but utilize the Vṛtti which, though fresh, was essential on

¹⁷ View of Vindhya-vāsa as reported in Ślokavārttika, 393, 704; Bhoja on Yogasūtra, 4, 22; Medhātithibhāṣya, 1. 55; Śyādvāda-mañjari, 117, and Guṇaratna on Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha is not always consistent with that of Iśvarakṛṣṇa.—Kaviraj in Introduction to Jayamangalā. Vindhya-vāsa accepts only two types of inference and no sūkṣmas' arīra.

¹⁸ Keith at another place holds that he cannot be later than 300 A.D.—‘Sāṅkhya,’ p. 43.

account of the very brief character of the Kārikā itself. Prof. A. B. Dhruva thinks¹⁹ that Anuyogadvārasūtra should be assigned to the latter part of the first century A.D. because it deals with Buddhism generally and does not refer to Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga and Buddhaghosa; while in dealing with the Sāṅkhya it points to three works besides the general work of Kapila; and so he places the Kārikā in first century B.C. and Māthara in the early part of first century A.D.

Dr. Belvalkar does not consider that Hiranya-saptati is the same as the Kārikā. The work may have been so named because it brought to the author so many gold pieces, or because it treats of Hiranyagarbha. It can be a commentary on the Kārikā by Vindhya-vāsa. Dr. Takakusu and Prof. Dhruva identify Hiranya-saptati and the Kārikā, and according to Prof. Dhruva it was wrongly attributed to Vindhya-vāsa.

There was a very early commentary appended to the Kārikā as proved by the Chinese translation. Dr. Belvalkar identifies the commentary with Mātharavṛtti,²⁰ because there is a great similarity between the two and passages, which are in the Chinese translation and which are not in Gauḍapādabhāṣya, are to be found in Māthara. The Chinese translation is not *verbatim*. It has been amplified at places to make easy for the Chinese to understand and to conciliate with their views.

Gauḍapādabhāṣya is an abridgment of the Vṛtti and therefore this Gauḍapāda cannot be the famous

¹⁹ *Vide* his paper in the proceedings of the First Oriental Conference.

²⁰ Takakusu holds that neither Gauḍapādabhāṣya nor Mātharavṛtti can be the original of the translation, but it has some earlier commentary on which these are based.

teacher of the teacher of Saṅkara. He has been referred to by Alberuni who refers to one more commentary on the Kārikā and he ought to be earlier than Vācaspati. How then to account for the non-appearance of the last three Kārikās in the Bhāṣya? Gauḍapāda comes later than Māṭhara and therefore their absence in the Bhāṣya cannot prove that by the time of Gauḍapāda the last three Kārikās were not interpolated; it may be an oversight of his.

Jayamāṅgalā is wrongly attributed to Saṅkara.²¹ It cannot be his on account of the slipshod style. Benediction to *Lokottaravādi muni* makes it a work of some Buddhist. Saṅkarārya has to his credit two commentaries—on Kāmandaka's *Nītiśāra* and Vātsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra*, known as Jayamāṅgalā. This very person seems to be the author of the commentary with that name on the Kārikā.

A more important side of the study of the early history of the Sāṅkhya is to see how it gradually developed into the classical form. The Sāṅkhya of the Upaniṣads is theistic and the dividing line between it and the Yoga is not clear. The Upaniṣads do not present a settled form of the Sāṅkhya. The number of the *tattvas*, their order and their conception remain to be made definite and uniform. The subjective side of the *gunas* possibly develops from the conception that the individual self was the result of the envelopment of the Absolute in the three *gunas*. The actual

²¹ See Introduction to Jayamāṅgalā by Pandit Gopinātha Kaviraj; besides Mr. Kavi identifies him with the author of *Yogasūtra-bhāṣyavivaraṇa* and places him about 1400 A.D.—*Vide* Literary Gleanings in Q. J. of the Andhra Hist. R. S., Oct. 1927.

influence of these tendencies on the final shape of the Sāṅkhya cannot be ascertained on account of lack of historical data. As long as the one or two cardinal principles, e.g., *svarūpa* of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, were not settled, these stray currents of thought and appearances in the Upaniṣads and other literature may have helped in the formulation of the Sāṅkhya concepts; but once they were suggested and ready, the system could stand on its legs and follow unhampered and unassisted its course of development. It must have remained dependent on extraneous matter till that light did not dawn; and next it must have rejected all unaccommodating material. Besides reservations are to be made on the subjective side. In spite of the ideas prevalent, the conception may have come in a moment of inspiration—though such flashes can also be explained as a product of the imperceptible influences of the times.

The extreme disinterestedness of *Puruṣa* and the claim of *Prakṛti*, constituted of three *gunas*, to account for all the inner and outer world independently, as the *Prakṛti*'s different manifestations without any inherent change, make the Sāṅkhya what it is. The earliest definite Sāṅkhya work that has come down to posterity is the *Kārikā*. Another important work, though not from the viewpoint of time, but from the viewpoint of development of thought is the *Sāṅkhya-Sūtra*. It comes much later and it softens dualism of the *Kārikā*. The *Kārikā* is a composite, short, complete work and it has the advantage, on account of its early date, of having received the attention of a mass of commentators within and beyond the Sāṅkhya pale. They put their own stamp on the text. They are the reflex of the then conditions and they create many new centres of

interest and activity. On account of these facilities a textual study of the Kārikā in its necessary and controversial details is attempted below. It is commonly read with the Tattva-Kaumudi and therefore Vācaspati's explanations are at times left out to be supplied by the reader.

KĀRIKĀ 1.*—All pain²² is *mānasa* but it is divided into three groups on the ground of its separate causes. *Mānasa* (*ādhyātmika*) pain has been defined by Gauḍa²³ as separation from the desired and association with the undesired. Cessation of pain is not possible in the Sāṅkhya because pain being a form of *guna* and the latter being eternal pain must ever exist. Pain is only suppressed and its recurrence is not possible because the seeds of ignorance, wherefrom pain sprouts, are all burnt.

Vācaspati has laboured hard to show that it refers to the concept formed of threefold pain and not to the whole compound. But what has he gained thereby?

Bhaatika according to Vācaspati includes trees and stones and his division is based on the four classes:—(1) born of the placenta, (2) born from eggs, (3) born from perspiration, and (4) born by bursting open the soil. Nārāyaṇa understands by *bhūta* things that are harmful to mankind. Gauḍa thinks that it means the five gross materials.

²² Yoga holds that our desire for liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation. Also compare Suzuki—‘Mahāyāna Buddhism.’

²³ Gauḍa stands for Gauḍapāda.

* तुःखग्रामिकाताजिज्ञासा तदभिग्रातके हेतौ ।

हे सांशार्थी चैत्रैकान्तास्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 2.*—*Avis'uddhi* means some fault in the details of the performance of prohibited slaughter.²⁴ But how, for example, is animal sacrifice at all permitted? The reasons are:—firstly, shortcomings falling under *vidhi* or *niṣedha* do no harm²⁵; secondly, the minor details help only in the fulfilment of the sacrifice and they have no bearing on the results²⁶; thirdly, *himsā* for man is disallowed and as such it is harmful to man, but it brings no blot on the sacrifice²⁷; fourthly, the prohibition of *himsā* applies to all cases generally, but because *niṣedha* has not been specially mentioned in the chapter on sacrifices it does harm to man alone.²⁸ The above attempts are to prove sacrificial slaughter as absolutely harmless, but that is shooting above the mark because then it would not remain *avis'uddhi*.

Max Müller has strained the meaning of *s'reyān* to show that there is no open hostility against Vedic rituals in the Sāṅkhya.

Vyakta is generally defined here by Vācaspati as other than *avyakta*. Some restrict it to *mahābhūtas* only. The differences are important because they create confusion later, when the objects of the different means of cognition are discussed. The contention of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā is that everything except Puruṣa and Pradhāna is an object of Pratyakṣa and as such *vyakta*, and, therefore, efforts are made to prove the existence of Pradhāna and Puruṣa by inference, while no efforts are made to prove *mahat*, *ahankāra*, etc. But

²⁴ Candrikā. ²⁵ Candrikā. ²⁶ Bālarāma.

²⁷ Kalpataru and Parimala on Bhāmati.

²⁸ Bālarāma.

* रक्षदानुभविकः स इविशुद्धिकायातिशययुक्तः ।

तद्विपरीतः अभ्याकृ व्यक्ताव्यक्तश्चिक्षानात् ॥ २ ॥

Vācaspati on Kārikā 6 changes and makes *vyakta* = earth, etc., which even a mudstained farmer can see, and *atindriya* = *Pradhānaparṇaśādi* forms the object of inference. *Ādi* will stand for sense-organs, etc., which have been elsewhere explained by him as the objects of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* form of *Anumāna*. Another explanation of the differences in the meaning of *vyakta* is that at times 8 *prakṛtis*²⁹ are admitted because if the other seven are not pure *prakṛti*, they are at least *prakṛti-vikṛtis*. *Vyakta* may have been made equal to earth, etc., because of the real part they play in differentiating knowledge.

KĀRIKĀ 3.*—The test of *prakṛtitva* is said to be the capacity to produce another *tattva*, and *tattvas* are to be judged by differences in *sthūlatā* and *indriyagrāhyatā*.³⁰ Such a definition was necessary to include *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra* and *tanmātras* and to exclude *indriyas* and *bhūtas*. There was no necessity of accepting the transformations of *bhūtas* as separate *tattvas* because the *bhūtas* by themselves were enough to bring a complete discriminative knowledge.

²⁹ Gitā 7. 4 gives the five *bhūtas* and the threefold *antahkarana* as the eightfold *prakṛti*. It may be a popular or an earlier doctrine.

³⁰ Some wrongly say that the test of *sthūlatā* applies to *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra*, *tanmātrās* and *indriyas* while *indriyagrāhyatā* to *bhūtas*. Their view is based on the invisibility of all else except *bhūtas*. On the other hand both tests should apply to all cases; some being prominent in some cases.

* मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिमहस्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।

शोदशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 4.*—Vācaspati has followed the practice of Nyāyasūtras in introducing this Kārikā when he says that general definitions of the means of cognition are given in this and the *vis'esañaksāna* follows. The procedure is justified there by the text itself, but here the Kārikā is devoted to enumeration only.

The *pramāṇa* table below shows how the definitions of the different *pramāṇas* are not settled and therefore they are classed under different categories by the same commentator or by different commentators taking the shade of meaning that appeals to them.

Name.	Pratyakṣa.	Anumāna.	Śabda.	No pramāṇa.
Upamāna	Vācaspati ...	Vācaspati ... Māṭhara ... Jayamañgalā ... Vijñāna ...	Gauḍa Vācaspati Jayamañgalā	
Arthāpatti	...	Gauḍa Vācaspati Jayamañgalā		
Abhāva	Vācaspati Vijñāna, Jaya	Māṭhara ...	Gauḍa	Candrikā
Sambhava	...	Vācaspati ... Māṭhara ... Jayamañgalā	Gauḍa Candrikā	Vācaspati
Aitihya	...	Māṭhara ...	Gauḍa Candrikā Vijñāna	
Pratibhā	Jayamañgalā	Jayamañgalā Candrikā ...	Jayamañgalā Gauḍa	Jayamañgalā

* रहस्यमानमात्रवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।

त्रिविष्णु प्रमाणमिहं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणादि ॥ ४ ॥

Sarvapramāṇasiddhavat means that the three enumerated *pramāṇas* include all the remaining means of cognition³¹ that are added by other systems. Nārāyaṇa distorts the sense and interprets—they are the only three means of cognition because they are accepted by all *pramāṭras* and to apply this sense to all cases, he has to make a further supposition that Vaiśeṣikas are no *pramāṭarāḥ* because they do not admit *s'abda-pramāṇa*.

KĀRIKĀ 5.*—Vijñāna questions the possibility of final cognition in *buddhi* for two reasons:—firstly, the expression *puruṣeyabodha* will become meaningless and, secondly, if the reflection alone of *puruṣa* is thought to serve the purpose, it cannot do so because it is unsubstantial, *tuccha*. The answer is that the image of a lifeless object may not be fit to cognize but the case is different with the image of a *cetana*.

In Guṇaratna's commentary³² there appears a line—“*pratiniyatādhyavasāyah s'rotrādisamuttho'dhyakṣam*,” which is in the same metre as the Kārikā. It can be admitted as a reading of the Kārikā only if grave changes are permitted in the other half of the Kārikā or if one more kārikā is added, because the other line has no mention of *anumāna*.

Vācaspati turns *lingalingipūrvakam* into faultless definition by repeating *lingi* once more. But Jayamaṅgalā interprets differently altogether—sometimes the inference is *lingapūrvaka* and sometimes *lingipūrvaka*, e. g., inferring cuckoo from her voice, or inferring her voice from the cuckoo.

³¹ Vācaspati, Jayamaṅgalā, Māṭhara.

³² On Śaddarśanasamuccaya, Bibl. Ed., p. 108.

* प्रतिविषयाभ्यसाथो इह, विविधमतुमानमात्मात् ।

तत्त्वात्तिक्षिप्त्वा, आस्मुतिरासद्वचनं च ॥ ५ ॥

*Trividha anumāna*³³ has everywhere been made to represent *pūrvavat*, *s'evaṭat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*; but they have been so variously interpreted that the uniformity remains in name only. They respectively mean—firstly, an inference where the *vyāpya* is seen, one by the method of exclusion, and an instance of the inferred of which is not seen; secondly, that it is from cause to effect or of a future happening, that it is from effect to cause or of a past occurrence, and that there is no relation of cause and effect or of present object; thirdly, *trividha* is made equal to *trirūpa*, i. e., *pakṣa-dharmatā*, *sapakṣe sattvam* and *vipakṣe asattvam*, which do not remain a classification of inference but denote the three essential conditions of a valid inference; fourthly, they mean *kevalānvayī*, *kevalavyatirekī*, and *anvaya-vyatirekī*.³⁴ The observations made on the *pramāṇa* table hold good with this analysis also.

Āpta is restricted not only to *Vedas* but it includes all proper sources and *s'ruti* means the knowledge produced by sentences, and this sense can be extracted by *lakṣaṇā* or *lakṣītalakṣaṇā*. Firstly *s'ruti* is to be applied to any ordinary or *Vedic* sentence and then it is to apply to the knowledge produced by such sentences.

³³ Sāṅkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the ground of the seven kinds of relations mentioned in *Tātparyāṭikā*.—Dasgupta, 'Hist. of Ind. Phil.', p. 269.

³⁴ See for a detailed treatment Prof. Dhruva's paper on 'Trividhamanumānam' in Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, pages 251-280.

KĀRIKĀ 6.‡—The majority³⁵ thinks that there was no necessity of giving the objects of *drṣṭapramāṇa*, because even an ordinary man knows them and therefore it takes the first half of the kārikā to mean:—invisible objects are known by *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* type of inference. Candrikā interprets the same line differently—common visible objects are known by *drṣṭa* and the invisible by inference. It has defined *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as an inference from other than *kāryakāraṇa* relation and that may be some reason for its interpreting the kārikā differently. Vācaspati includes *s'esaavat* in *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, but his *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* alone even is of help in most cases, whereas that of Candrikā cannot infer *Pradhāna* and *Puruṣa*.

Ādi in *prakṛtipuruṣādi* of the Tattvakaumudī can only be interpreted as *tatsāmyoga*³⁶ and not as *mahadādi*;³⁷ otherwise it is redundant.

KĀRIKĀ 7.†—A similar kārikā appears in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya 4. 1. 1,³⁸ and there is every possibility that Iśvarakṛṣṇa borrowed his ideas from that kārikā. The

³⁵ Vācaspati, Gauḍa, Māṭhara.

³⁶ Vāṁśīdhara.

³⁷ Bālārāma; compare Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 1. 103; also see note on kārikā 2.

³⁸ Dasgupta strangely holds that such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of Indian Philosophy and he therefore suggests that it is the verse of a Sāṅkhya book paraphrased by Iśvarakṛṣṇa.

* सामान्यतस्तु द्वादशीन्द्रियाणां प्रसिद्धिरनुभावात् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्दं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

† अतिवूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौकृम्याद् व्यवचानादभिभवात् समानाभिहारात् ॥ ७ ॥

causes given in the *Mahābhāṣya* are six and all of them except *tamasdṛṣṭatāt* correspond with those given in the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, and that too may be partially made to agree with *abhibhāvāt*. The latter has made improvement over the former in number. It is not clear why both separately mention *indriyaghātāt* and *manonavasthā-nāt*. Manas is also an *indriya*. *Candrikā* gives scope to add any number to the eight causes. *Māṭhara* adds four and *Vācaspati* one. *Jayamāṅgalā* reduces them to four—defects of space, of sense-organs, of objects and of other things. To be more exact they can be reduced to two—defects of the objects and of the sense-organs. *Desadoṣa* and *arthāntaradoṣa* are no more than defects of the objects. The eight causes of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* can be similarly reduced to two.

KĀRIKĀ 8.*—Inconsistency in *Vācaspati*'s interpretation, similar to that pointed out above in kārikās 2 and 6, again crops up here. He introduces the kārikā—What then is the reason for the *anapalabdhi* of *pradhāna* and others? Why does he use the plural form in *Pradhānā-dīnām*? Does he want to introduce *mahat*, *ahankāra*, etc., also? But at a later stage he mentions only *Paruṣa* and *Pradhāna*. These are all irregularities, which may be due to his uncertainty on the point. The plural can be explained if many *pradhānas* are admitted but the kārikā never mentions it.

KĀRIKĀS 10 and 11 show that *prakṛtisarūpam* and *prakṛtivirūpam* are common attributes of all *vyakta*, but they can be separately adjusted, the former applying to *prakṛtivikṛtis* and the latter to *vikṛtis*.

* सौकर्यात्मदुपकिञ्चनांमावात्, कार्यतस्तुपकिञ्चिः ।
महादादि तत्त्वं कार्यं, प्रकृतिविकृपं सरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 9.*—Keith³⁹ correctly observes that “ the last four arguments which are in effect but two, rest on the perception that in the product the original material is contained, though under change of appearance, and that definite materials give definite and distinct results; the first argument, on the other hand, rests not merely on the fact that the coming into being of any object save from a definite material is not observed, but also on the argument that if a thing does not exist there can be no possibility of its doing anything ”. He must have grouped together in the first instance *upādānagrahaṇāt* and *s'aktasya s'akyakaraṇāt*, and in the other *sarvasambhava-bhāvāt* and *kāraṇabhāvāt*.

Vācaspati and Jayamaṅgalā mean by *grahaṇāt*—*sambandhāt*; but Gauḍa, Candrikā and Māṭhara take it in the literal sense of procuring.

KĀRIKĀ 10.†—The explanation of Vācaspati and Candrikā that *vyakta* is many because *buddhi*, etc., are different with each *Puruṣa*, seems more correct because the opposite suits to one *Pradhāna* which is common to all *Puruṣas*. Gauḍa, Māṭhara and Jayamaṅgalā hold *vyakta* many because *mahaṭādi* are twenty-three. Vijñāna introduces a farfetched sense—*vyakta* is many because it is different with different periods of creation, *sarga*. In his opinion, if the word is interpreted otherwise, *Pradhāna* will also become many on account of the three *guṇas*. Bālarāma points out the fallacy in

³⁹ In ‘Sāṅkhyā System,’ p. 73.

* असद्वकरणादुपादानग्रहणात्, सर्वसम्बद्धाभावात् ।

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, त्रयद्यावाह, सत्कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

† हे भद्रगित्यमन्यापै सक्षिप्तमगेकमात्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सादवयं परतन्त्रं व्यर्थं विपरीतमन्वयम् ॥ १० ॥

Vijñāna's argument—Prakṛti is not divided into separate entities by the *guṇas*.

The best explanation of *sāvayavam* is that in which parts and wholes are mixed up.⁴⁰ It is also described as one in which sound, touch, etc., are found.⁴¹ But all *vyakta* has not the qualities of sound etc. Some take it to mean that which has *guṇas*,⁴² others one which has the two aspects of *ādhyātmika* and *bāhya*.⁴³ These explanations also do not cover all the cases of *vyakta*.

Candrika says that *avyakta* is *niṣkriya* because it does not suffer *s'āntādikriyā*; but then *tanmātras* will fall out from the manifest, *vyakta*. Jayamaṅgalā says that *kriyā* means *samsaraṇa* and therefore, though Pradhāna creates the universe, yet it does not move because it pervades the three worlds. Vijñāna removes 'the difficulty by explaining *kriyā* as some definite action like *adhyavasāya*, etc.

Hetumat means one that has a cause.⁴⁴ Māṭhara makes *hetu*=*kāraka* and *jñāpaka*, and according to him Pradhāna is also *kāraka*. But how then will these attributes be restricted to *vyakta* alone.

Āś'rīta means existence in its cause⁴⁵ or in its parts.⁴⁶ It means *vṛttimat* according to Candrikā. Jayamaṅgalā explains the purpose in separately mentioning *hetumat* and *āś'rīta* when they approximately mean the same:—the former means that a thing is produced and the latter means that that thing finds shelter in another.

Mahat, etc., also pervade the world. Why are they then called *avyāpi*? They pervade only in a

⁴⁰ Vācaspati, Gauḍa.

⁴¹ Gauḍa, Jayamaṅgalā.

⁴² Candrikā, Māṭhara.

⁴³ Jayamaṅgalā.

⁴⁴ Vācaspati.

⁴⁵ Vācaspati, Aniruddha.

⁴⁶ Vijñāna.

secondary sense because they cannot pervade their own cause.⁴⁷

KĀRIKĀ 11.*—Bālarāma says that Pradhāna is three *gunas* itself and therefore it cannot be their *adhāra*. To remove this difficulty he gives two explanations—firstly, that *gunas* here should be taken to mean pleasure, etc., which are the qualities of *sattva* and others; secondly, they should be applied to Pradhāna in the manner 'trees in a forest.' Vārṣidhara says that *gunas* are in the form of *kāraṇa* in *mahat*, etc., and in the form of *samūha* in Pradhāna. Do these commentators, then, mean that *mahat*, etc., have something more than the three *gunas* and that *gunas* are not in the form of *kāraṇa* in Pradhāna? These are unnecessary differences pointed out. How the *tanmātrās* will be *triguna*? They do not possess the qualities of pleasure and pain. They are *triguna* because they are the product of *ahankāra* and because they produce the *bhūtas*, both of which possess pleasure, etc.

Sāmānya means common to all like a *mūlyadāsī*.⁴⁸ Candrikā gives an optional interpretation—alike on account of possessing *gunas*. Vācaspati thinks that *sāmānya* and *viṣaya* have been purposely used to refute the principles of Vijñānavādins that objects have no external existence; they are *vijñānamaya*.

Puruṣa is opposite of the qualities mentioned in this and the previous kārikā. But is then Puruṣa one? Gauḍa and Māṭhara say that he is one, which is a con-

⁴⁷ Vārṣidhara.

⁴⁸ Gauḍa, Māṭhara, Jayamaṅgalā, Candrikā.

* त्रिगुणमविद्येदि विषयः सामान्यमपेतम् प्रसवधर्मिः ।

त्वरतः तथा प्रधानं, तद्विपरीक्षस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

tradition; but Jayamāṅgalā uses a device to avoid it. It interprets *tadviparitah* as different from *vyaktīvyakta* in some qualities only. Vācaspati is clear that one of the differences with Nyāya is that in the Sāṅkhya, the Ātman or Puruṣa does not possess *sukha*, etc. Jayamāṅgalā is wrong when it says that Puruṣa is *cetana* because he experiences pleasure, etc. He is *cetana* because he is all light and because his approximity moves Pradhāna to action.

KĀRİKĀ 12.*—Gunas are not the qualities of Nyāya. They are Parārthāḥ, i.e., they execute enjoyment and renunciation for Puruṣa.

Artha means capacity⁴⁹ and therefore, though in the state of dissolution, there is no *prakāś'a*, etc., their possibility persists.⁵⁰

Anyonyāś'rayāḥ-guṇāḥ are all-pervading⁵¹ and therefore *āś'raya* is used in the restricted sense that one *guṇa* is *āś'raya* of the other, with regard to which it acts.⁵² Bālarāma points out the difference between *anyonyāś'raya-vṛttayāḥ* and *anyonyajananavṛttayāḥ*—the previous applies to dissimilar effects and the latter to similar effects; but then the statements cannot individually cover the whole field of *vyaktīvyakta*, the former will

⁴⁹ Gauḍa.

⁵⁰ Bālarāma.

⁵¹ According to Bhāṣya on 1. 127, each *guṇa* cannot be *vibhu*, e.g., *sattva* represents many *sattva* entities classed under one group; otherwise, firstly there cannot be incalculable differences in the effects and secondly *sādharmyam* in the next sūtra will be meaningless.

⁵² Vācaspati, Māṭhara.

* श्वसप्रतिविचादात्मकः प्रकाशप्रतिविचारायाः ।

अस्योऽन्याभिभवाभवत्त्वनभिभुत्त्वम् गुणाः ॥ २२ ॥

apply to *vyakta* and the latter to *avyakta*. This is in conflict with the meaning of Candrikā also, according to which 'ca' shows that all the processes go on simultaneously and not partially. Vācaspati and Candrikākāra have taken *anyonya* and *vṛtti* with each of the remaining words of the compound; but Gauda and Māṭhara take *vṛtti* separately to mean one additional process.

The *guṇas* may be regarded as representing the different stages of evolution of any particular product. *Sattva* signifies the pure and perfect stage that is to be reached, *tamas* the obstacles or the meanest stage, and *rajas* the force by which obstacles are overcome and the products become more defined and definite.

KĀRIKĀ 13.*—Gauda and Māṭhara give some examples of the effects of 'cala' quality in *rajas* :—a bull becomes intoxicated, or it makes one quarrelsome or one wishes to go to a village, or one begins to love some women, etc.

Vācaspati has given the example of *vāṭapittas'lesma* in addition to that of a lamp in the Kārikā to elucidate the harmonious working of opposite qualities and Bālarāma thinks that the additional example is more appropriate because they are more opposed to one another than oil, wick and flame.

Vācaspati says that like *sukhaduhkhamohāḥ*, *sukha-prakāś'alāghavāḥ* do not create more varieties. This statement is doubtful and groundless except that the latter represent the different phases of the one quality pleasure and not different *guṇas*. How do the conflicting *guṇas* combine? Yogabhāṣya explains that *atīśayas* only

* सर्वं रस्तु प्रकाशकमिदस्यपृष्ठमन्तं चक्षं च रजः ।

गुह्यरजकमेव तमः प्रसीदत्वार्थंतो तृतीयः ॥ १३ ॥

are in conflict but they combine with *sāmānyas*. Why then do they not flood the perceiver all at once? The answer is that though the conflicting *guṇas* exist everywhere yet only one at a time comes to prominence in accordance with the corresponding environments, *nimittas*. But *dharmaśyāḥ* also exist everywhere and at all times without distinction. No, they cannot, because they are momentary.

KĀRIKĀ 14.*—The predominant opinion is that the first half of the kārikā is to prove that Pradhāna is indiscriminative, etc., which is clear in the case of *vyakta*. Vācaspati takes the other option also in which both *vyakta* and *avyakta* are to be proved indiscriminative, etc., by the *avīta* form of reasoning. Gauda accepts the optional meaning of Vācaspati. Candrikā holds it proved that Prakṛti is indiscriminative, etc., and proceeds to prove the same in *mahadādi*. Introducing the second half of the kārikā, it says that if *mahat*, etc., had no prime cause, there would be no liberation because *mahat*, etc., would become ever-existing.

KĀRIKĀ 15.†—*Samanvayāt* means similarity in the different evolutes.⁵³ Gauda gives a loose meaning—as one infers from the sight of a Brahmacāri that his parents must be Brāhmaṇas. The explanation of Vijnāna⁵⁴ does not directly fit in the kārikā.⁵⁵ He says

⁵³ Vācaspati, Candrikā.

⁵⁴ Vijnāna stands for Vijnānabhikṣu.

⁵⁵ On Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 1. 131.

* अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः श्रेण्यात्प्रद्विपद्याभावात् ।

कारणगुणात्मकस्त्वात् कार्यस्थावरकमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

† भेदानां परिमाणात्, समन्वयात्, वाक्तिः प्रकृतेऽ ।

कारणकार्यविभागात्, अविभागाद्वैश्वर्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

that the emaciated *buddhi*, etc., on account of fasting, again grow strong after taking food; this shows that they are effects. But the *kārikā* is about the existence of *avyakta*.

KĀRIKĀ 16.*—The second part of the first half of the *kārikā* has been interpreted differently. Vācaspati keeps *trigunataḥ* to indicate the activity of Prakṛti in the state of dissolution which is of the type of similar effects⁶⁶ and *samudayāt* is to denote its activity in the state of creation which is in the form of prominence and subordination of *gunas*; but Gauḍa, Candrikā and Māthara apply both the words to the movement of Prakṛti in the state of creation only. According to Gauḍa, the former is used to express that the three *gunas* in Prakṛti are utilized in the effects; and according to Candrikā, it is used to account for the manifoldness of effects.

To refute the objections that there would be always movement or no movement, the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra—‘*sāmyavaiśamyābhyām kāryadvayam*,’ and the Pañcaśikha-Sūtra—‘*ubhayathā cāsyā pravṛttih pradhānavyavahāram labhate nānyathā*’ are worth remembering.

KĀRIKĀ 17.†—It is strange coincidence that the existence of Puruṣa, Prakṛti, and *satkāryatā* have been all proved by five arguments.

Aniruddha on sūtra 1.140 has said, or *dravakāṭhinatā* is *sāṁhataśvam*; but this is not proper because it does not

⁶⁶ Sarala Sāṅkhya denies (similar) effects in the state of equilibrium.

* काणमस्याद्यकं प्रदत्ते त्रिगुणतः समुदयात् ।

परिणामतः स किलवद् प्रतिप्रतिगुणात्मविद्येत्वा ॥ १६ ॥

† संवातपरार्थवात् त्रिगुणाद्विविद्येत्वाद्विद्यात् ।

पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तुभावात् केवलाद्यं प्रहृतेऽम् ॥ १७ ॥

contribute towards the necessity of accepting Puruśa; the word must carry the sense of enjoyability in some aspect to need someone else to enjoy.

Purusa is *adhiṣṭhātā* only by nearness to Pradhāna and its effects,⁵⁷ or he dominates as a king does and therefore his superintendence should not be objected on the ground that he has no attributes or that he has no activity.

KĀRIKĀ 18.—Order in birth is ordinarily meant to convey that when one is born, everybody is not born and order in death means that when one is dead, everybody is not dead. But Māṭhara gives one more meaning to the expressions :—some are born low and some high; accordingly there is order in death when we say that my brother is dead or my father is dead.⁵⁸

Puruśas must be many.⁵⁹ One Puruśa cannot be divided into many by mere adjuncts, *upādhīs*, because—(1) then hands and feet will also represent separate Puruśas, (2) the distinction between the released and the bound will disappear because the portion of space that falls vacant by the ruin of a pot can be filled in by procuring another pot.

⁵⁷ See Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 1. 96.

⁵⁸ Radhakrishnan objects to the argument because then birth and death will apply to the eternal Puruśa who is *asaṅga*.

⁵⁹ The plurality is not so much a reaction against some philosophical principle as a survival of primitive animism.—Carpenter, 'Theism in Mediaeval Ind.' Oldenberg suggests the appropriateness of the grammatical interpretation of Puruśa—dwells in the body (locative), which it can leave.

* जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनिष्ठमादद्युगपत्रकृतेष्व ।

पुरुषकहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययात्मैव ॥ १८ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 19.*—Puruṣa is *draṣṭā* because he is *cetana*,⁶⁰ or because he is *madhyastha*.⁶¹ He is *akartā* because he is *viveki* and *aprasavadharmi*,⁶² or because he is the latter⁶³ or because he is *madhyastha*.⁶⁴ This shows how differently the attributes of Puruṣa in this kārikā are derived from the attributes given in kārikā 11. Vijñāna justifies the mention of two like words, *sākṣitva* and *draṣṭṛtva* by pointing an imaginary difference that Puruṣa is *sākṣi* with reference to *buddhi* and *draṣṭā* in relation to others.⁶⁵

KĀRIKĀ 21.†—The prime cause of creation is the nature of Pradhāna to move for the enjoyment and release of Puruṣa and not their union alone as emphasized in kārikā 66 also. This to some extent reduces the force of the objection generally raised against the examples of the lame and the blind—Prakṛti is *jaḍa* and Puruṣa is *akartā* and therefore, they cannot express their intention to combine like the lame and the blind.

Vācaspati takes *dars' anārtham* with *pradhānasya* and *kaivalyārtham* with *paruṣasya*. Gauḍa and Māṭhara take otherwise. This makes a paltry difference in their interpretation, because both processes proceed from Pradhāna in the interest of Puruṣa.

⁶⁰ Vācaspati, Jayamāṅgalā. ⁶¹ Gauḍa. ⁶² Vācaspati.

⁶³ Jayamāṅgalā. ⁶⁴ Gauḍa. ⁶⁵ On Sūtra 1. 161.

* तस्मात् विषयांसात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

कैवल्यं माध्यस्थं प्रदृश्यमकर्तुभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

तस्मात्तस्यं गोगाद्येतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तुर्ये च तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

† पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।

प्रदृश्यन्दवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 22.*—Vācaspati, Māthara, Jayamāngalā and Candrikā hold that one *tanmātrā* combines with one, two, three, or four to produce the more complex *bhūtas* with the corresponding number of qualities. Gauda says that they can singly produce the *bhūtas*. As regards they themselves, according to Vyāsabhāṣya, *tanmātrā* of sound accompanied by *ahaṅkāra* produces the *tanmātrā* of touch and so on. A meaningless question is raised by Vijñāna—how then ether gross and fine is to be contrasted; and the question raised has been answered thus—gross ether takes the help of *bhūtādi*. The difference is there simply because gross ether is a further stage in evolution.

A fictitious etymology is given to *ahaṅkāra*, when it is said that the word was coined by taking the first and the last letter from the list of 64 letters to represent all objects that can be denoted by the combinations of those letters.

KĀRIKĀ 23.†—The determination of objects by *buddhi* is compared to the forthcoming sprout in a seed by Gauda, but this has no meaning.

Gauda has divided knowledge, *jñāna*, into external, *bāhya*, and internal, *ābhyantra*. The external knowledge gives worldly pleasures and the internal causes liberation. There is no room for such classification because *jñāna* in the kārikā means nothing else than the

* प्रकृतेमंहान्, तसोऽहङ्कारः तस्माद्गुणश्च घोषकः ।
तस्माद्विषयोऽहङ्कारात् पञ्चम्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

† अध्यवसायो तु द्विर्वर्त्मोऽज्ञानं विरागं ऐश्वर्यम् ।
तात्त्वेऽत्त्वेऽत्त्वं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥
अभिमानोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्विविदः प्रवर्तते सर्वाः ।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तम्भात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥

final knowledge of the distinction of Pradhāna and Puruṣa. *Vimocayatyekarūpēna* and *siddheḥ parvo 'nkuś'ast-
rividhah* in kārikā 63 and 51 respectively establish the same meaning. Gauda has continued the craze for division in *vairāgya* also and he has become ridiculous in explaining internal *vairāgya*—Pradhāna also is here like dream or magic representation.⁶⁶ *Vairāgya* is only helpful in true knowledge which is differentiation of attributeless soul from Pradhāna and its creation. These must not be any more owned by Puruṣa.

Garimā is one of the *ais'varyas* according to Vācaspati. Gauda, and Jayamaṅgalā place *kāmāvasāyitvam* in its place; and Māṭhara mentions both, raising the number to nine. Bālarāma's edition does not give *garimā* in the text of the *Tattvakaumudī*, while Varmīdhara's edition counts *kāmāvasāyitvam* as the eighth variety instead of *is'itva*.

KĀRIKĀ 25.*—Vijñāna is of the opinion that only *manas* emanates from the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra*. The sense cannot be extracted from the kārikā without grave distortions. Rajoguṇa is not considered to have separate effects. It only makes possible the working of the other two *guṇas* by imparting movement to them. The masculine in *ekādas'akāḥ* also cannot point to *manas* alone. The sūtra—*sāttvikamekādas'akam*, relevant to the matter in hand, is confusing, but *ekādas'akam* is fixed down to mean eleven in a latter sūtra—*karmendriyabuddhīndriyairāntaramekā-
das'akam*. There is no difficulty in deriving *karmendriyas* from *vaikārika*, because if that question is raised, the

⁶⁶ Contrast Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 1. 45.

* सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृताद्वृक्षारात् ।

मूलादेवस्तन्मात्रः स सामसः, तैजसादुभयस् ॥ २५ ॥

division of *Vijñāna* also cannot stand on its merits—how can *buddhindriyas* be derived from *taijasa*. Bālarāma divides the *sattva* into *utkāta*, *madhyama* and *nikṛṣṭa* to account for *manas*, *buddhindriyas* and *karmendriyas* respectively. The last support is awkwardly removed by Vānsīdhara, who maintains that organs only in a body⁶⁷ have been called *taijasa* in Smṛtis and not individual organs.

Vijñāna thinks that separation of *ahāṅkāra* and evolution of *tanmātras* take place in *mahat* and this has been brought in line with the *kārikā* conception by Dasgupta by using the Yoga expression, *samsṛṣṭāḥ viviccyante*—the two conceptions take the two aspects of the matter in hand.

KĀRIKĀ 26 *—*Indrasyātmans' ehnatvam* is not a satisfactory and exclusive definition of *indriyāṇi*⁶⁸ because it applies to other *tattvas* than *indriyas* also. Candrikā and Māṭhara give another meaning—in *padena viśayāḥ tān prati dravanti*. This excludes *manas*.

KĀRIKĀ 27.†—The second half of the *kārikā* should refer to the eleven *indriyas*; *nānātvam* should stand for *vṛttiniyama* and *bāhyabhedāḥ* for *des'aniyama*,⁶⁹ i. e., how the organs are differently situated in the body. But Vācaspati and Candrikā take *bāhyabhedāḥ* as an example showing that there is similar multiplicity in *tanmātras* that are products of one *bhūtādi*. Candrikā and Māṭhara

⁶⁷ While Sāṅkhya Saṅgraha says that the godlike *indriyas* of *svayambhū* are produced from *vaikārika* and individual organs from *taijasa*.

⁶⁸ Vācaspati.

⁶⁹ Jayamaṅgalā.

* तुदीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुः शोश्राणाणरसनस्पर्शनकानि ।

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् कर्मेन्द्रियाप्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

† उभयात्मकमन्त्र भनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधग्यात् ।

शुगपरिणामविशेषाचानात्मं वाहमेदाश ॥ २७ ॥

give *grāhyabhedācca* as an optional reading and then it becomes one more argument for numerosness of organs besides *gunaparipāmavīśeṣāt*. Vāṁśīdhara has expressed a foreign idea that *manas* also becomes many as it comes in contact with the different *indriyas*. The first half of the kārikā is not well-arranged and well-worded; at the first reading *sāṅkalpākam* and *indriyam* seem to express the meaning of *abhayātmakam*, but then *sūdharmaśūlāt* is left alone and therefore at second thought the line has to be differently construed.

KĀRIKĀ 28.*—The word *mātra* stands to show that *buddhindriyas* have only indeterminate knowledge,⁷⁰ while Vijnāna thinks that they have determinate knowledge, which conception will relegate *manas* to a very subordinate position, and it will remain no more than a seat of desire, doubt and imagination, while only the previous kārikā has called *manas* as *sāṅkalpākam*. Gauḍa and Māṭhara think that *mātra* is to indicate that one sense-organ has one's own field and that it does not encroach over another's, e. g., eyes only perceive objects and do not taste. Candrikā thinks it limits the sense to seeing, hearing, etc., and it excludes fetching, etc., which are the functions of *karmendriyas*.

Bālārāma thinks that the sense of *vṛttayāḥ* has to be strained to apply to *karmendriyas*.

KĀRIKĀ 29.†—Gauḍa is preferable because he gives a homogeneous division. He takes the previous kārikā and this together, and transfers both uncommon and

⁷⁰ Compare Kumārila and Pras'astapāda.

* शब्दादित्यु पञ्चानामालोचनभात्रमिथ्यते वृत्तिः ।

चचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गरनन्दाश्र पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

† स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिक्षयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाच्चादायचः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

common *vṛttis* to *bāhyendriyas* and *antahkarana* jointly.⁷¹ The objection that *prāṇas* continue to function even in deep sleep when *indriyas* disappear remains to be answered. Nobody advocates the disappearance of *indriyas* in deep sleep. They stop functioning only.⁷² The consensus of opinion is with Gauda. Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 5. 113 is of opinion that *prāṇas* are from *indriya-s'akti* and the *Pāñcarātras* hold the *rajas* element in *mahat* as *prāṇa*. Each of the five *prāṇas* is not always similarly located by the different commentators. Their functions are also differently given and Māthara seems to connect them with the three *guṇas*.

KĀRIKĀ 30.*—*Catusṭaya* according to Gauda means *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *manas* and some one *indriya*, but then it will exclude the case, say that of *dīrghas'askuli*, in which two or more sense-organs⁷³ work simultaneously. The latter case is also possible because the majority of Sāṅkhya authors admit *manas* to be of *madhyama parimāṇa*. The objection that such *manas* will be transitory cannot arise in the Sāṅkhya.

‘*Tat*’ does stand for *drṣṭa*, but that meaning cannot be naturally extracted from the construction in the kārikā. Gauda holds *kramas'ah jñānam* in *adrṣṭa* only as arbitrary. If he had to make an arbitrary supposition in spite of what the kārikā purports, he should have done otherwise, because *kramas'ah jñāna* is possible under

⁷¹ When the uncommon *vṛtti* of both *antahkarana* and *indriyas* has been related, why should common *vṛtti* apply to the former only?—Vaidiki Vṛtti on 2. 31.

⁷² Vaidiki Vṛtti on Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 2. 31.

⁷³ Sūtra 2. 31 mentions *indriyas* only.

the following circumstances:—in dim light according to Vācaspati and Candrikā, or when at a distance according to Māṭhara and Gauda, which means that external limiting factors account for *kramas'ah jñāna*. They are absent in *adrṣṭa*. To be consistent with the kārikā *kramas'ah jñāna* in *aurṣṭa* may be explained by the mental state that at times hastens and at times lingers the process.

KĀRIKĀ 31.*—Gauda incorrectly applies the kārikā only to the threefold *antahkarana*. Candrikā maintains the observations made in the previous kārikā—when there is no obstruction like that of doubt, etc., the action is simultaneous otherwise it is *kramas'ah*, and *svām svām pratipadyante* is to emphasize that even in simultaneous action each organ keeps to its function.

Māṭhara says that *karaṇas* act after getting a signal from *buddhi* but to be more correct the process in the case of perception, etc., begins with the *bāhyendriyas* and in the case of speaking, etc., it begins with *buddhi* downwards.

KĀRIKĀ 32.†—The functions have been differently attributed and their results differently enumerated. The functions are so classified :—

Name.	Gauda.	Māṭhara.	Vācaspati, Candrikā.
Āharaṇam	Karmendriyas.	Indriyas	Karmendriyas.
Dhāraṇam	„	Ahaṅkāra	Threefold <i>antahkarana</i> .
Prakāśakaraṇam	Buddhindriyas.	Buddhi	Buddhindriyas.

* स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकृतदेतुकां शृणिष्ठ ।

पुरुषार्थं पश्च हेतुनं केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

† करणं श्रयोदशविर्धं तदहरणाधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।

कार्यं च तस्य दशाऽऽहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाशयं च ॥ ३२ ॥

The explanation of Gauḍa ignores *antahkarana*. According to Vācaspati, *antahkarana* preserves life by means of *prāṇas*.¹⁴ Gauḍa, Māṭhara, and Jayamaṅgalā do not take ten with *āhāryam*, *dhāryam* and *prakāś'�am* separately, and, therefore, the ten effects according to them are the objects of *buddhindriyas* and *karmendriyas*—*s'abda*, etc., and *vacana*, etc. Vācaspati and Candrikā take ten with each and their ten *āhāryas* are *divyādivya vacana*, etc.; ten *dhāryas* are *prāṇādilakṣaṇayā vṛttiā s'arīram*, *tacca pṛthivīdi pāñcabhautikam*, *s'abdādīnām pañcānām samūhah pṛthivi*, *teśām divyādivyatayā*, and the same are ten *prakāś'yas*. Mystery attaches to the meaning of this kārikā even after the extensive explanation. The kāryas are not clear, but the interpretation of Vācaspati and Candrikā has an advantage over others because the former have been able to justify the occurrence of *das'adhā* with each.

Vidha is used according to Vāṁśīdhara to show that though the *karaṇas* are numberless on account of numberless Puruṣas, yet they can be grouped under 13 heads.

KĀRIKĀ 33.*—Gauḍa strangely joins *sāmp्रताकालम्* with *viṣayākhyam*. Vācaspati takes it to mean those periods of past and future also that are near the present so as to avoid *avyāpti* in the *vṛtti* of *vāk*. How can *karmendriyas* be *dvāri* to *antahkarana*? Candrikā answers—that they can also be of use in the function of *antahkarana* through the *buddhindriyas*.

¹⁴ This statement cannot stand according to Gauḍa, etc.; see notes on kārikā 29.

* अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दक्षाधा वाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयालयम् ।

साम्प्रतकालं वाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 34.*—Why *tanmātras* are *avis'esa*? The different opinions are—(1) *mātra* only excludes the specialities of *s'ānta*, etc., and does not exclude the qualities that have come from previous stages⁷⁵; (2) they have not been called *vis'esa* like the *indriyas*, though both are produced from *ahankāra* because they further produce *bhūtas*⁷⁶; (3) they are pleasure-giving to the gods, *sattva* is predominant in them and, therefore, they are called *avis'esāh*.⁷⁷

KĀRIKĀ 35.†—*Sarvam* has been interpreted by Gauḍa and Māṭhara to mean past, present and future objects, but the kārikā can only be indirectly applied to past and future objects because in their cognition, the deposited results only, of the use of *bāhyendriyas* at some previous occasion, are utilized; and, therefore, there is no sense in calling *antahkaraṇa*, *dvāri*, in such *adṛṣṭa* cognitions.

KĀRIKĀ 36.‡—*Pradīpakaṭpāḥ* means that they illuminate the objects like a lamp and so it can be construed with *prakāś'ya*; but Vācaspati interprets it as wick, oil and flame to elucidate *parasparavilakṣaṇāḥ*.

KĀRIKĀ 37.‡—The kārikā is to prove the supreme position that *buddhi* occupies. Vācaspati takes the two

⁷⁵ Vācaspati; *Yogavārttika*; justified by kārikā 38.

⁷⁶ *Yogavārttika*. ⁷⁷ Māṭhara; Gauḍa on kārikā 38.

* बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।

वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

† सान्तःकरणं बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मान् ।

तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

‡ एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणाः गुणविशेषाः ।

कृत्वा तु पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धीं प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

‡ सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।

सैव च विशिष्टाः पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

halves of the kārikā as two arguments but Gauḍa and Māthara introduce the first and second halves with *yasmāt* and *tasmāt*, respectively, i. e., introduce causal relation between the two statements. Candrikā introduces the kārikā thus—*buddhi* though supreme does not work for herself, but for Puruṣa.

Vis'inasti pradhānapuruṣāntaram is interpreted by Vācaspati as ' makes known the already existing minute difference between Pradhāna and Puruṣa.'

KĀRIKĀ 38.*—Vācaspati and Candrikā say that one ' *ca*' is to denote *hetu* and the other to denote *samuccaya*. This is superfluous but it is characteristic of Indian commentators who try to attach significance to every word in the text.

Vaṁśidhara illustrates pleasure, etc., by the examples—the touch of air, fire and poison, but there cannot be separate examples for individual *guṇas*. Each object represents all the three *guṇas* and it becomes pleasurable, painful or indifferent as they come to prominence.

KĀRIKĀ 39.†—Candrikā ingeniously makes the statement in the kārikā—*mātāpitṛjāḥ nivartante*, to include *prabhūtāḥ* also and it says that the former have been specially mentioned to show the *gaṇatva* of *jīva*.

KĀRIKĀ 40.‡—The kārikā uses such attributes as could have been differently interpreted but there is

* तन्मात्राप्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।

पञ्चे सूक्ष्मा विशेषाः शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

† सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैङ्गिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।

सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

‡ एवोरपक्षमसकं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

संसरति निरूपमोगं भावैरधिष्ठासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

'not much difference amongst the commentators which may be due to their meaning having behind it a continuous tradition.

Niyatam means which persists from the first creation to the great dissolution⁷⁸ or which persists as long as true knowledge does not arise.⁷⁹ But Candrikā interprets it as different for every soul.

Gauda does not include *bāhyendriyas* in the *sūkṣmas'arīra*. Sāṅkhya-Sūtra enumerates *buddhindriya*, *prāṇas*, *buddhi* and *manas*. A modern writer⁸⁰ has suggested that the non-inclusion at times of *ahankāra* in the constituents is because in the beginning there was only one *sūkṣmas'arīra*.⁸¹ This would be at once contradicted by Vācaspati who says that in the beginning, Pradhāna created separate *liṅgas* for each Puruṣa. Others say that *ahankāra* is not mentioned because it is included in *buddhi*. Vijnāna on sūtra 3. 11 says that there are three types of bodies and they are sometimes said to be two because *liṅgas'arīra* and *adhisṭhānas'arīra* are confused into one for two reasons—firstly, because each depends on the other, and, secondly, because they are subtle.

KĀRIKĀ 41.*—The explanation of Gauda seems more appropriate because he means the subtle body by *liṅga*. *Liṅga* has been used in the previous and the next kārikās to mean *sūkṣmas'arīra* and, therefore, that is the meaning that spontaneously strikes the reader. It has

⁷⁸ Vācaspati.

⁷⁹ Gauda, Jayamaṅgalā.

⁸⁰ Ghosh: 'Sāṅkhya System and Modern Thought.'

⁸¹ *Hiranyagarbhopādhīrūpa*, Bhāṣya on 3. 10.

* चित्रं यथाश्चयमूर्ते स्याण्वादिभ्यो यथा विना छाया ।

तद्विनाशविशेषैः न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

been used in kārikā 10 for *buddhyādayaḥ* and Vācaspati takes that sense and makes *vis'esaḥ* = *sūkṣmaḥ s'ariraiḥ* on the basis of kārikā 39, but this means a repetition of *buddhyādayaḥ* except the *mahābhūtas*, which are absent in *sūkṣmaḥ arira*. Liṅga in kārikā 10 qualifies and covers the whole field of *vyakta*. Gauḍa has been wise in making *nirūś'rayam*⁸² qualify *liṅgam*, so that, *tanmātras* are excluded, and he joins *vināvis'esaḥ* and takes out of it not *vis'esaḥ* like Vācaspati, Māṭhara and Candrikā, but *avis'esaḥ* which has been used in kārikā 38 for *tanmātras*. Māṭhara also takes out *avis'esaḥ* but interprets it like Vācaspati—*tanmātrāṇi tairārabdhām sūkṣmaḥ ariram*. Candrikā adopts the meaning of Vācaspati, and as an optional meaning gives that *liṅga* = *samudayātmakam liṅgaḥ ariram* cannot exist without the support of gross body.

KĀRIKĀ 42.*—*Prasāṅgena* has been rendered by *prasakti*⁸³ but it can be better rendered—‘on account of.’

Vibhūtva has been correctly explained by Vācaspati and Candrikā as *vais'varūpyāt*; but Gauḍa and Māṭhara interpret it—‘as a king is supreme in his dominions.’

KĀRIKĀ 43.†—The kārikā has been made ambiguous by the commentators. Vācaspati thinks that this kārikā gives the division in *nimitta* and *naimittika*, while the next tells as to what *naimittikas* proceed from what *nimittas*. In the previous kārikā all had agreed to render *naimittika* as *sthūladehādi* and the other as *dharmādi*. But here *vaikṛtāḥ* is equated to *naimittikāḥ*

⁸² Vācaspati makes it modify *na tishthati*. ⁸³ Vācaspati.

* पुरुषार्थैसुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।

प्रकृतेविभूत्ययोगात् नटवद्वयवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

† सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।

दृष्टाः करणाभ्यिणः कार्याभ्यिणश्च कललादाः ॥ ४३ ॥

which are *dharma* according to the *kārikā*. Jayamaṅgalā introduces *kārikā* 46—the 16 *nimittanaimittikas* related before are here briefly stated as of four kinds. Vācaspati, Candrikā and Jayamaṅgalā divide the *bhāoas* in two types only but Māṭhara and Gauḍa divide them in three—(1) *sāṁsiddhikāḥ* as of Kapila; (2) *prākṛtikāḥ* as of the sons of Brahman; (3) *vaikṛtikāḥ* as ours.

To Vācaspati and Gauḍa, *karana* = *buddhi*, but to Māṭhara it is equal to *buddhikarmāntaḥ karanaḥ abhedāḥ trayodas'a*. Are *prākṛtikābhāvāḥ* limited to *karanas* only? The question rises in reading Jayamaṅgalā and Vāṁśīdhara. If *prākṛtikābhāvāḥ* were only in Kapila, the question is decided, otherwise both types of *bhāvāḥ* can have their *āśraya* in *karana* and *kārya*.

An odd opinion appears in Candrikā—*prākṛtikāḥ* are those that stay as long as the thing itself, e. g., *ahankāra*, etc., from *mahat*, and *vaikṛtikāḥ*, that stay by fits and starts.

KĀRIKĀ 44.*—Inclusion of *dakṣiṇābandha* in the *bandhāḥ* has been used as an evidence of the jealousy of the Sāṅkhya towards Vedic rituals. *Prakṛtibandha* is when one worships *Prakṛti* thinking it *Puruṣa*.⁸⁴ Māṭhara includes in it the eight *prakṛtis*. *Vaikṛtikāḥ* are when one worships *bhūtendriyāḥ* *ahankāra* *buddhiḥ* taking them for *Puruṣa*.⁸⁵ Māṭhara considers them due to *aisvarya* or due to believing *brahmādīsthāna* as the final goal. *Adhastāt* is *sutalādiloka*⁸⁶ or *tiryagyoni*.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Vācaspati, Jayamaṅgalā. Why should Vācaspati not equate this *bandha* with his *asṭavidhāvidyā* in *karikā* 48?

⁸⁵ Vācaspati.

⁸⁶ Vācaspati, Candrikā.

⁸⁷ Jayamaṅgalā, Gauḍa, Māṭhara.

* धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद् भवत्यधर्मेण ।

शानेन चापवगो विषयेयादिप्यते वन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

Dharma is not an important conception in the Sāṅkhya and therefore it is loosely interpreted.

KĀRIKĀ 45.*—Prakṛti is explained as *mahađahaṅkāra-bhūtendriyāṇi* by Vācaspati and *bhūtendriyāṇi* are replaced by *tanmātrāṇi* by Gauḍa, Māthara and Jayamangalā. It is strange how *bhūtendriyāṇi* have been included in Prakṛti. Why should Vācaspati differ from what he has said in the previous kārikā about *prakṛtibandha*? All have qualified *vairāgya* in the kārikā by *jñānasūnya*, and that is necessary because *vairāgya* coupled with *jñāna* alone is a means to liberation as mentioned in the Sāṅkhya Sūtra.

KĀRIKĀ 46.†—Keith⁸ thinks that the kārikās 46 to 51 are possibly later interpolations. The reason given is that they uselessly reclassify the *pratyayasarga* in a different manner from what has been done in the previous two kārikās and kārikā 23. The argument is not correct because there appear other such unimportant kārikās in the body of the work and their presence should be accounted for by the further *viveka*, distinctive knowledge, they give. The kārikās, if this procedure is admitted, will also lose their importance of determining the character of the Śaṣṭitantra. Gauḍa and Māthara have become crude in trying to become simple and illustrative about the divisions:—*as'kti* as after properly seeing the post, one is not able to remove doubt; *tusṭi*, he is not anxious to know the post because

⁸ In 'The Sāṅkhya System,' p. 85.

* वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलक्ष्यः संसारो भवति राजसाद्वागात् ।

मैथ्यर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात् तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

† एव प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तिरुदिष्टिक्षयः ।

गुणवैषम्यविभैर्न तस्य भेदास्तु पद्माशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

• of what use is that knowledge to him; *siddhi*, he sees the creeper that runs along the post and he has the knowledge of the post.

Siddhi alone is regarded capable of bringing salvation, and Gauḍa says that *tuṣṭi* is the *tāmasa* knowledge and *siddhi* the *sāttvika* knowledge of persons on the path of liberation.

KĀRIKĀ 47.*—How can *asmītā*, *rūga*, *dveṣa* and *abhinives'a* be *viparyayas*? The answer is that though they do not proceed from *viparyaya* still they are of the nature of *viparyaya*. Candrikā says that the propriety of saying *karaṇavaikalyāt* is in debarring many more *as'aktis* caused by diseases, and in limiting the number to twenty-eight.

KĀRIKĀ 48.†—Vācaspati suggests, as if, leaving *avidyā*, the remaining *viparyayas* affect only *devāḥ*, gods. It seems that *avidyā* alone matters for common people; and the rest, because they include *diśyādivya* and *animādayaḥ*, affect yogins.

KĀRIKĀ 49.‡—*Indriyavadha* cannot be *pratyayasarga*; it may be partially *ahankārasarga*; and therefore it can be called *pratyayasarga* only indirectly because it proceeds from *ahaṅkāra* which is in *pratyayasarga*.[§]

^{**} Jayamaṅgalā.

* पञ्च विषययमेदा भवस्यशक्तिश्च करणवक्त्यात् ।

अष्टाविंशति भेदाः तुष्टिवधाऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

† भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।

तामिल्लोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवस्यन्वतामिलः ॥ ४८ ॥

§ पुकादशेऽन्द्रियवधाः सह तुष्टिवधैरशक्तिरहिष्टा ।

सप्तदश वधा तुष्टेविषययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

KĀRIKA 50.*—Vācaspati and Māṭhara say that *viṣayas* are five and *uparamas* are also five. If the similarity is only in number, the expression is harmless, but if it denotes causal relation, the statement cannot be justified because each *uparama* does not proceed from one *viṣaya* separately but it proceeds from the collective restraint of the five objects. Candrikā and Gauda avoid such ambiguity. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā realized the difficulty and, therefore, he divided *uparamas* into two kinds—firstly, the five *vairāgyas* arising from seeing the futility of the five enjoyable objects, and, secondly, from seeing the dark side of *arjanarakṣaṇa*, etc.

Prakṛtyākhyā^{⁹⁰} is when one feels that the realization of true knowledge is a natural phase of Prakṛti and therefore it needs no meditation, etc.,^{⁹¹} or when one knows the Prakṛti, its *saguṇanirguṇatva* and its similar products and is satisfied with that,^{⁹²} or when one knows the Prakṛti but not its *saguṇanirguṇatva*, etc.^{⁹³} Candrikā names *megha*, the *ādhyātmika tuṣṭi* that Vācaspati calls *ogha*. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā thinks that *salila* is actually *s'arīra* and it has been formed by suffixing *iran* to the root *sar*. *R* has been replaced by *L* because they are the same. *Ogha* and *vr̥ṣṭi* have been so called because they resemble rain in uncertainty.

The names of the five *bāhyāḥ tuṣṭayāḥ* are variously given :—*pāram*, *supāram*, *pārāpāram*, *anuttamāmbhāḥ*, *uttamāmbhāḥ* (Vācaspati, Candrikā), *sutamah*, *pāram*,

^{⁹⁰} These four are differently given in Sāṅkhyā Saṅgraha as *paramātmatva* in Prakṛti, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *tanmātras*.

^{⁹¹} Vācaspati, Candrikā, Jayamāngalā.

^{⁹²} Gauda. ^{⁹³} Māṭhara.

* आच्यात्मिकाभसत्तः प्रहस्युपादानकालभाग्यालयाः ।

वाक्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च, नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः ॥ ५० ॥

sunetram, nārikam, anuttamāmbhasikam (Gauda), *tāram, sutāram, sunetram, sumāricam, attamāmbhasikam* (Māthara), *sutāram, supāram, . . . , anuttamāmbham, uttamāmbham* (Jayamaṅgalā). This shows the uncertainty about their names. Rāmāvatāra Sarmā has forced some interpretation into the names given by Vācaspati—the first is called *pāra* because it carries one beyond the pains of earning; the second is called *supāra* because one may be tempted to enjoy even when one has realized the troubles of earning, but it is practically impossible for one to think of enjoying when one sees the troubles of protecting; the third is called *pāvāra* because one who observes depreciation is at times tempted, and at others not tempted; the fourth is *anuttamāmbhāḥ* because it arises from a selfish desire, i.e., on account of the fear of diseases in enjoyment; and the fifth is *uttamāmbhāḥ* because it is prompted by mercy.

KĀRIKĀ 51.*—Vācaspati has explained the five *siddhis* in two ways and the other commentators have adhered to one method or the other, or they have drawn material from both the sets. The first meaning given by Vācaspati looks artificial. He has distorted the meanings to class the eight *siddhis* into *hetu*, *hetuhetumati* and *helumati*. He could not have remained satisfied without introducing regularity where it was wanting. The other meaning sounds more correct and natural because in it there is neither the necessity of twisting the sense of words, nor of changing their order. This meaning has been picked up by Jayamaṅgalā and there is every possibility that Vācaspati borrowed it

* ऊः शः दोऽव्ययं दुःखविवातावधः सुहृष्टासिः ।

दानं च सिद्धाश्रोऽसि द्वे: पूर्वोऽहुशास्त्रिवः ॥ ५१ ॥

from Jayamaṅgalā, or that there were two concurrent traditions.

Vācaspati thinks that *aṅkus'a* is used in the sense of distractive, *nivāraka*, and therefore, for him the three-fold *aṅkus'a* is *viparyaya*, *as'akti* and *tuṣṭi*. Vijñāna says that it means attractive, *ākarṣaka*, and therefore the threefold *aṅkus'a* is *ūha*, *s'abda* and *adhyayana*; *suhr̥tpṛāpti* and *dāna* being of lesser importance. The objection that *tuṣṭi* and *atuṣṭi* cannot be both averse to *siddhi* is answered thus—that they represent two independent *dharma*s and not the absence of each other. *Uha*, etc., are themselves *siddhis* and therefore they should not be counted as *aṅkus'a*. Vācaspati is therefore correct and the confusion arises because *aṅkus'a* bears a double meaning.

The *atuṣṭis* and *asiddhis* can be settled with great difficulty. Gauḍa and Māṭhara have given them opposite names because they represent opposite ideas—*anambhāḥ*, *asalilāḥ*, etc.; but Jayamaṅgalā gives to the *asiddhis* the names *moṣamusñamānoparamityādyāḥ*.

KĀRIKĀ 52.*—Naturally *bhāva* means *pratyayasarga* and *linga*, *sūkṣmas'arīra*. They have been used in previous kārikās in this sense but in this kārikā their sense has been slightly strained. Vācaspati makes *linga* = word, etc., and the twofold body, and *bhāva* = the thirteen karaṇas which are not possible without dharma, etc., because these two *sargas* are essential for the enjoyment and release of Puruṣa. According to Gauḍa, *linga* is *tanmātrasarga* up to the fourteen *bhūtas*; according to Candrikā it is the non-visible group of *mahat*, etc.,

* न विना भावैलिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्दृतिः ।
लिङ्गाक्षयो भावाभ्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्वाः ॥ ५२ ॥

and according to Māṭhara, it is *sūkṣmas'arira* and the thirteen *karaṇas*. Vijnāna regards the two kinds more closely to a creation of intellect, regarding *liṅga* as *buddhi* itself and *bhāva* as its conditions.

KĀRIKĀ 53.*—There is no harm in calling the *bhautikasarga* as a phase of the *liṅgasarga*; Jayamaṅgalā and Māṭhara hint it as a third *sarga*. Aniruddha on sūtra 3. 46 divides the whole creation into six—*sura*, *asura*, *nara*, *preta*, *nāraka* and *tiryak*, and *sthāvara* are included into *nāraka*. Candrikā has two alternative devices for the case of pot, etc.—(1) they are not included because *bhautika* means bodily, or (2) they are to be included in *sthāvara*. The latter view is held by Vācaspati.

KĀRIKĀ 55.†—*Liṅgasyāvinivṛtteḥ* is dissolved in two ways by Vācaspati—(1) *liṅgasya avinivṛtteḥ*, (2) *liṅgasya ā vinivṛtteḥ*. The latter device is resorted to by Gauda, Candrikā, Māṭhara, and Jayamaṅgalā. Māṭhara reads *samāsena* = *sāṅksepeṇa* in the kārikā instead of *svabhāvena*. Jayamaṅgalā thinks that *jarā* and *maraṇa* include *garbha* and *janma* also. *Liṅga* should mean *sūkṣmas'arira* because that will suit the belief that *liṅga* disappears after *viveka* only.

KĀRIKĀ 56.‡—Māṭhara and Gauda have given a worldly example of *svārtha*;—as one does his friend's work as

* अष्टविकल्पो द्वैस्तैर्यग्नेनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।

मानुष्यशैकविधः समासतोऽयं त्रिधा सर्वः ॥ ५३ ॥

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्वः ।

मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

† तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।

लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः, तस्माद् दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

‡ इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतीं महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षायां स्वार्थं इत्य परार्थं आरभः ॥ ५६ ॥

if it is for himself. Candrikā extracts another shade of meaning. It says—as others work for their own interest, so the movement of Prakṛti for the sake of Puruṣa is also possible because movement requires some sort of purpose. *Vimoksārtham* according to Vācaspati is to indicate that the ever-active Prakṛti does stop for some particular Puruṣa, who has gained knowledge; and according to Candrikā it is to indicate that the world may cease for one but continue for the rest.

KĀRIKĀ 57.*—Gauḍa, Māṭhara and Jayamaṅgalā apply the example to *nivṛtti* also—as the cow stops giving milk when the calf is nourished. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā says that a cow does not give milk as long as she does not give birth to a calf, though she takes her regular food; this is the force of *vatsavivṛddhaye*.

KĀRIKĀ 59.†—*Prakāśya* cannot mean after giving direct knowledge of Pradhāna because it is always to be inferred. Therefore *ātmānam* in the kārikā means *s'abdādyātmanā*. The same can be further elucidated by what Abhyāṅkara⁴⁴ says on the necessity of postulating *bhūtas* and *indriyas*—the formula is that liberation is caused by the knowledge of the difference in Puruṣa and Prakṛti but Prakṛti is too subtle to be known, and it can be known through its effects only; *prakṛti-*

⁴⁴ In commenting on Sarvadars' *anasaṅgraha*, Bhandarkar O. R. I. Publication, p. 319.

* वासविष्णुद्विनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरजस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥
अैसुक्ष्यनिवृत्यर्थं यथा कियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

† रजस्य दर्शनित्वाः लिङ्कर्त्तते नसंकी यथा नृत्यास्त् ।
पुरुषस्य तथाऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य लिङ्कर्त्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

vikṛtis are also difficult to know and therefore *bhūtas* and *indriyas* are admitted as *tattva*; and there is no necessity of multiplying the *tattvas* by further accepting cow, pot, etc., separately.

How can Prakṛti, which is *vibhu*, turn aside? The trouble could be simplified, if it was held that the Prakṛti did not turn aside but that it was only recognized in its true colour and so the *samsāra* ceased for the individual Puruṣa. This explanation would have been faultless, but the Sāṅkhya bases all movement in Prakṛti on its *samyoga*⁹⁵ with Puruṣa⁹⁶ without which it will remain always inactive. The meaning of *samyoga* cannot be restricted to sympathetic response⁹⁷ because Puruṣa is quality-less.

Some say that after the release of Puruṣa, Prakṛti keeps aloof, assuming the form of some god. Different *tattvas* having different superintending deities, *adhi-daiva*, is a conception of the later Sāṅkhya.

KĀRIKĀ 60.—Vācaspati and Candrikā have used the kārikā to strengthen the pre-mentioned idea of selflessness in Prakṛti, but Māṭhara and Gauda wrongly think

⁹⁵ But in kārikā 66, *samyoga* is left of no importance—creation is due to ignorance and it ceases when Prakṛti has accomplished the enjoyment and release of Puruṣa because then there remains nothing more for it to do, even if there is *samyoga*.

⁹⁶ Pāñcarātras add one more principle, *kāla*.

⁹⁷ Vijñāna holds a real contact and differentiates between contact and change; therefore contact does not bring change in Puruṣa.

* वानाविवैरुपायैरुपकारिन्द्र. पक्षोरेणः सुंसः ।

गुणवत्तगुणस्य सततस्त्वार्थमपार्थकं चरति ॥ १० ॥

that the kārikā gives some clue to the cause of cessation of activity in Prakṛti. Māthara has well characterized the relation of it and Puruṣa as—like the feather of a peacock he is painted only on one side.

KĀRIKĀ 61.*—Gauda has a quaint explanation in store—Prakṛti has no further cause and therefore it does not again come in view of the released Puruṣa ; for that reason it is *sukumāratara*,⁹⁸ i.e., it has no better lord over it like *is'vara*, etc., as its cause. While Jayamāngalā says that before knowledge Prakṛti shows itself only in *vyakta* form and when knowledge is attained, it feels that it has no subtler⁹⁹ form than *avyakta*. It should plainly mean sensitiveness.¹⁰⁰ Vāmśīdhara uselessly tries to justify on all fours the example of *kala-vadha* by saying that it refers to the *jaṭa* body and *buddhi* that looks *cetana* on account of the proximity of Puruṣa ; but he has not noted a greater disharmony when Vācaspati and Gauda say that she does not see other persons.¹⁰¹ The case is opposite with Prakṛti ; it ceases for the Puruṣa who has the discriminative knowledge, and continues to charm the remaining lot.

⁹⁸ Here = *subhogyatara*. ⁹⁹ Here = *sūkṣmatara*.

¹⁰⁰ Nyāyamañjari objects to the delicacy of Prakṛti which is enjoyed by infinite number of Puruṣas ; and Hall in translation of Gore : ' Hindu Phil. Systems ', objects because it is insentient.

¹⁰¹ They could have safely said that she does not see again the same person.

* प्रहृते: सुकुमारतरं च किञ्चिदत्तीति मे भरिमंवति ।
या रहात्मीति पुर्वन् दक्षेनसुपैति पुरुषस्त ॥ ६१ ॥
तस्माद्बध्यते नापि मुख्यते नापि संसरति कवित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुख्यते च नानाभ्यर भ्रष्टति: ॥ ६२ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 63.*—Candrikā wrongly says that *ātmā* is *buddhirūpa* and *ātmānam* = *paruṣam*, Prakṛti binds itself by itself, no blot stains the Puruṣa.¹⁰² How is *acetana* Prakṛti either bound or released? *Bhoga* will mean *avasthā*, *lakṣaṇa*, and *parināmabhedas* that are visible in Prakṛti.

KĀRIKĀ 64.†—*Kevalam* = not mixed with *viparyaya*¹⁰³ but Candrikā strangely equates it with what is visible to Puruṣa only, which is not a sound expression because of the disinterestedness of Puruṣa.

KĀRIKĀ 65.‡—*Svasthah*—*ātmāni sthito na prakṛtisthah*, *tatah prakṛteḥ nivṛttatvāt* according to Jayamaṅgalā; but Vācaspati reads *susthah* and strains its meaning to suit the context—he still has a slight mixture of *sāttvīki buddhi*,¹⁰⁴ otherwise he cannot see Prakṛti. Vācaspati admits this mixture only in *Jivanmukta* state; but what is the harm if it continues in *mokṣa* state also? It will then facilitate the understanding of the multiplicity of Puruṣas even when they are released.

¹⁰² Strengthened by *saiva* in the second half of the kārikā.

¹⁰³ Vācaspati, Gauḍa.

¹⁰⁴ Tilak in *Gītārahasya* thinks it a device to avoid increasing the number of *guṇas* by accepting one more finer state.

* रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु व्यात्यात्मानमात्मनः प्रकृतिः ।

सैव च पुरुषायं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

† एवं तत्त्वात्यात्मासाक्षात्स्मि न ये नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विसुद्धं केवलमुत्पत्ते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

‡ तेन किं ज्ञानस्यात्मर्थवद्वात् सप्तकृपविभिन्नताम् ।

प्रकृतिः पश्यति तु रूपम् प्रेक्षकवद्विष्टतः स्वतः ॥ ६५ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 66.*—Gauḍa and Māṭhara have given two worldly examples to illustrate the cessation of all activity in Pradhāna—(1) when debts are cleared, and (2) as no progeny from cohabitation of the old.

KĀRIKĀ 67.†—*Jivanmukta* state¹⁰⁵ is not possible because when indiscrimination is destroyed there can remain no body. *Vijñāna*¹⁰⁶ surmounts the difficulty by saying that indiscrimination and actions work only through *samyoga* and this *janmākhyasamyoga* is not destroyed without the fruition of *prārabdha*.

KĀRIKĀ 70.‡—Rāmāvatāra Śarmā has pointed out *yatibhāṅga* in ‘*Pāñcasākhāya* tena.’

The last three kārikās are missing in Gauḍapāda-Bhāṣya. Wilson was the first man to point out that the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā had only 69 verses and one verse was lost. Mr. Tilak reconstructed the missing verse from bhāṣya on kārikā 61 and thought that it was

¹⁰⁵ Yogavārttika thinks that *asamprajñātayoga* is superior to knowledge because it overcomes *prārabdhakarma*.

¹⁰⁶ On Sūtra 1. 24.

* इस्युपेक्षक एको द्वाहमित्युपरमत्येका ।

सति संयोगेऽपि सयोः प्रयोजनं नाति सर्वस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

† सम्बन्धानाधिगमाद्यमादीनामकारणग्रासौ ।

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रमवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

प्राप्ते शरीरमेदेऽचरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।

ऐकान्तेकमात्यन्तिकः भयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

पुरुषार्थानभिदं गुह्यं परमविषयं समाव्याप्तम् ।

स्थिरस्युपरिम्लम्बाद्विन्द्यस्यै यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

§ एतत्पवित्रमन्यं मुनिरामुरयेऽनुष्ठम्यवा प्रददौ ।

आमुरितपि पञ्चशिलाय तेन च वहुधा कृतं तम्भन् ॥ ७० ॥

dropped because it was very atheistic. But it is not clear on what ground the loss of one kārikā is manifest. If the already existing 70th verse is to be rejected as not forming an essential part of the Saptati, the 69th verse can also be rejected on the same ground. Disquisition of the principles of the Sāṅkhyā is over at the, 68th kārikā and if the 69th kārikā is necessary to impress, the authenticity of the work, the 70th is needed to give, the line of succession of the old teachers, and the uninterrupted tradition of the system.

शिष्यपरम्परयाऽऽगतमीष्टरकृष्णेन चेतदार्थाभिः ।
 संक्षिप्तमार्थमतिना सम्बन्धिताय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥
 सप्तस्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य विद्वितन्त्रस्य ।
 आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

श्रीकृष्णलम्हासुगिमप्रजीतामि

सांख्यरत्नाणि

तथा च

श्रीमद्वीक्षरकृष्णप्रणीताः

सांख्यकारिकाः

मेधाकरशास्त्रिणां प्रस्तावना सहिताम्

विद्वान्

विष्णु वेदान्तेश सोवनी, एम.ए., एलएल.डी.

इत्येतैः संशोधिताः

पुण्यपत्तने

ओरेन्टल बुक एजन्सी

१९३५

अस्तावना ४

आत्मनारमपदार्थवर्णनावप्रवृत्तानि शास्त्राणि हि दशनशास्त्राणीति निगच्छन्ते । तानि पुनः विलाक्षणाद् (गौतम) कणाद् (उद्दक) जैमिनि पतञ्जलि कृत्याद्वैपायन (व्यास) महर्षिभिः संपादितानि क्रमेण सांख्यन्याय-वैशेषिकमीमांसाद्योगोत्तरमीमांसानामुद्धिर्वच्छिमन्ते च । ज्ञानकाण्डापरपर्यायवाचीम्युपनिषद्विद्यामूलकानि शास्त्राण्येतानि मोक्षविचरणीयोऽधिपत्रां विस्तारयितुमलन्तरां मुमुक्षुणामित्यलमतिगिरा । अनस्तंगमितमहिमान्यलौकिकशानाभिकरणानि चामूनि लोकोत्तरमस्त्वारत्यासिमहाङ्गविद्यापरपर्यायोपनिषद्याद्युभूतिसमकालमेव लोके प्राकादान्तः । तदक्षराधिगतिहेतुतयाऽविरतं विप्रियक्षिराद्विद्यमाणविनि परमोपकारीणि तान्वधुलापि सत्रवृत्तिभाद्युप्युपशारोरैः मूर्तां-दीपाद्याद्यकाशे संमुक्षसितानि वरीकर्तन्ते । परमप्रतिष्ठामीमांशावभ्यो वयं तान्युपेक्षामहेऽन्वहमिति सुतरामसम भूतो विषयः । इक्षितं हि परापरतया विद्यानां द्वैविष्यम् । तत्र ज्ञानादिरपरा प्राणिनां भोगभूतये प्रवृत्ता परा च निःश्रेयसादेति । न जातु कश्चित् जीवात्माभूताभूतिं केवल्यं वा उपेक्षेतेति भगवती श्रुतिः समाह “आत्मा भारे द्रष्टव्यः भ्रोत्स्वो मन्त्रव्ययो निदिष्यासितव्यश्च” इति । एतदेवाभिष्याव महर्षयः शास्त्रमादिष्टसंपर्किपरकालं व्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमिति शास्त्रमो दर्शनानि प्रादुरदत्तुः ।

तदेतद्वन्द्वः पातिविषयेषु तावज्जगत्समीकोचयितुमहेभ्—किमिदं जगदिति? प्रकृतिपरिणाममयं विश्वातितस्वात्मकं तदिति कायिलं मतम् । योगदर्शकारो-प्येवमेव समर्थयति सांख्यमतवत् । परमाणवारब्धसंयोगविद्योगजन्माकृति-विशेषस्तदिति स्यादविद्यान्तः । तस्वहयो वैशेषिकोऽपि तद्वन्मन्त्यते । स्वरूप-सोऽनाचन्नतप्रवाहस्पर्योभावियोगवज्जगद्वच्छारयति जैमिनिः । नानारूप-क्रियात्मकं मायापरिणामः वेतनविवर्ते एवेति मायावादिनः ।

तद्विनिगुणारमकप्रकृतिरिति सांख्याः । कर्मनुयोगं प्रकृतिस्तस्तिवामक ईश्वरव्येति पतञ्जलिः । ईश्वरादिनवपरमाणव ईसि नैव्याधिकाः वैशेषिकाश्च । जीवादपरमाणव इति जैमिनिः । अभिष्ठविनिविस्तोपादानमीश्वर इति वेदाभिलः ।

ईश्वरो नितवेच्छाज्ञानादिगुणवान् विभुः कर्तृविशेष इत्यास्तिकः । सांख्योऽनास्तिकस्तेष्वरस्याने पुरुषविशेषो जानाद्यकिरनेकसंख्य इति यावद् भूते । क्लेशकर्मविपाक्षशैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वर इति पतञ्जलिः । नित्येच्छाज्ञानादिगुणवान् विभुः कर्तृति न्यायवैशेषिकी । शून्यमेवेति जैमिनिः । मायाविशिष्टतेतन इति मायावादिनः ।

जीवस्वरूपे निजेयेऽसंगमेतत्त्वो विभुर्नाना भोक्ता च स इति सांख्या योगश्च । ज्ञानादिच्छुद्दर्शगुणवान् कर्ता भोक्ता जडः विभुर्नाना चेति न्यायवैशेषिकी । अहेतनारमको विभुः जाना कर्ता भोक्ते सीमांसकाः । अविद्याविशिष्टतेतन इति अहैतिनः ।

केन हेतुना बध्यते इति बन्धहेतुं निर्णयन्ति—अविद्येको बन्धहेतुरिति सांख्ययोगीः । अज्ञानमिति न्यायवैशेषिकी । श्रिचिद्दक्षमाणीति जैमिनिः । अविद्यवेत्यहौती ।

बन्धकब्दस्य परिभाषनिर्णयः— अज्ञातमादित्रिविधुः सानि बन्ध इति सांख्यो बद्धति । प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगजन्याविद्यादिक्लेशपंचकं बन्ध इति पतञ्जलिः । एकविशितिदुःखानीति न्यायवैशेषिके । नरकादिदुःखसम्बन्ध इति सीमांसकः । अविद्या तत्कार्याणीति मायावादिनः ।

मोक्षपदार्थः क इत्यन्न श्रिविधुः सञ्चांसो मोक्ष इति सांख्यः । प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगाभ्युपूर्वकाविद्यादिपंचक्लेशात्मन्तकिरहः इति योगः । एकविशितिदुःखानीति न्यायवैशेषिकी । स्वर्गप्राप्तिरिति सीमांसकः । अविद्यातत्कार्यहानपूर्वकपरमानन्दविन्दनमिति वेदान्तिनः ।

मोक्षसाधनानि । जिज्ञासितम्यानीस्तुच्यते—प्रकृतिपुरुषविदेको मोक्षसाधनमिति सांख्यः । निर्विकल्पकसमाधिपूर्वको विवेक इति पतञ्जलाः । इतरभिज्ञात्मज्ञानमिति गौतमकणार्दी । वेदविहितकमेति जैमिनिः । अज्ञासमेकपदोऽपि इति वेदान्तिनः ।

उद्दिष्टं संक्षेपेण पृष्ठशीलस्थविषयजातत्त्वम् । इत्यानीं सांख्यशास्त्रं सीमांसमानैर्बद्धतुमूलं तत्त्वित्यते—मास्तिककाविकेन स्वयं पूर्वमुपरिवद्दस्य सांख्यपूर्वकम् संश्लेष्य सत्त्वसमात्मस्य इत्यविशितसंश्लेषकस्य संक्षिप्तसूत्रस्य विस्तरेण वहन्यात्मकोऽथ श्रिविधुः सांख्यम्भानिहृतिरस्यन्तपुरुषार्थ इत्यारम्य यदा

तदा तदुच्छितिरित्येतावरपर्वम्: सूत्रोपनिषद्: प्राप्यो व्याप्तिः । तदनुपादेत्वं चादि महाभारतादौ कथितम् । कर्दमादेवहृत्यामभिजातस्य सेवरसांख्य-वादिनः कपिलस्योपदेशसूत्राणि स्विदानी। नोपलभवन्त इत्यनुसन्धायकानां परामर्थः । संभाष्यते चैतासितकर्त्त्वादसूत्रदयो नानाविधप्रस्तुतमित्यात्मकं वितर्णेतरं वर्षं प्रकर्त्त्वमन्वयमसि किञ्चुत्तर्णि समभूवद्, इति कर्णाकिणिकाऽपि भ्वेत्वात्तर्णः । आस्तिककपिलस्य भगवत्प्रतारता—“सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः” इति भगवद्वाक्येन व्यक्तेऽपि । श्रुत्या च “अर्थिं प्रसूतं कपिलं वस्तमभे ज्ञानैविभृतिं जावमानं च पश्येत्” इति, अनेका सिद्धा । सत्येवमपि चर्चेः कपिलस्य परिचयमवासुं भूमा प्रयासोऽपेक्षितः ।

इदानीं वैज्ञेयिकाक्षरैः सांख्यमतं स्पर्यम्—सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः । साचेचैव । पुरुषास्तु परं भिद्यन्ते । ते च नित्याः । अपरिणामिनो वित्यैतन्यस्त्वभावाः । ते च पंगवोऽपरिणामित्वात् । प्रकृतिस्त्वम्भ्या जडत्वात् । यथा विषयमोमोच्छा प्रकृतिपुरुषमेवद्विद्धका च प्रकृतेभवति तदा स्य पुरुषोपरागदक्षात् परिज्ञमते । तस्याच्चाच्चायः परिणामो बुद्धिरम्भः-करणविशेषः । बुद्धिरेव महत्तत्त्वम् । सा च बुद्धिर्दर्शजयन्त्रिमयला । तस्याच्च बहिरिन्द्रियप्रणालिकाय विषयाकारो यः परिणितमेदो घट इति पट इति-आकारकस्त-ज्ञानं वृत्तिरिति चार्याचरते । स्वध्यायां बुद्धौ वर्तमनेन ज्ञानेन चैतन्यस्य पुरुषस्य भेदाग्रहात् अहं जानामीति योऽभिमानविशेषः सैवोपलक्षिः । सूक्ष्मादिविषयसञ्चिकर्त्त्वात् इन्द्रियप्रणालिकैव सुखदुःखायाकारो बुद्धिरेव यः परिणामविशेषः स प्रस्तुयः । अत पृथक् ज्ञानसुखदुःखेच्चाऽप्यत्त्वात् त्वर-भमांधर्माः सर्वं एव बुद्धेः परिणामविशेषाः सूक्ष्ममन्वतया प्रकृतयेव वर्त-मानाः अवस्थाभेदाद्विभवन्ति तिरोभवन्तीति च । पुरुषस्तु रज्जुपलाङ्कावासे-लेयः प्रतिविष्टते बुद्धौ । तमसे तस्मानि पंचविशेषतिः । मूलप्रकृतिः महत्त्वम-इडारः शब्दस्पर्शसूपरसगृहाः पञ्चतन्मात्राणि पंचभूतानि पंचज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि पंचकर्मेन्द्रियाणि भनः पुरुषश्च परिणामवादः । केवला प्रकृतिः केवला विकृतिः प्रकृतिविकृतयुग्मयमनुभवं च । तथाच—“मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः महावाचाः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सह । योदकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्विकृतिः पुरुषः”—इतिष्वाचकोशातोऽच्याहतम् । (पृष्ठ १०५)

स्फुटतराकररिदमिं शेषम् द्वैताद्वैतपरेतु दर्शनमन्येतु पूर्वमीमांसाऽद्वैतवादिनो, वेदान्तादिदिमोऽद्वैतपरः द्वैतपराणि वेत्तराणि दर्शनाणि केवलप्रैक्ष्यम्-वादितीवं व्याप्तेति स्वानुभूतेक्षमानस्याः जो विद्वान्द्वैतवासीत्तर्वानेवंयाय तात्त्वद् वेदान्ताशास्त्रं प्रहृतं तद्वत् प्रहृतेः परः परः पुरुष इति सेश्वरसांख्यैरक्षरः स्त्रीरीकृतः । ‘विश्वात्तरमरे केन विजानीयात्’ इति संमान्यं कापिलं शास्त्रं कर्त्त्वाः प्रहृतेः समालोचकं पुरुषतस्वमपरं प्रहृतेः परं विरक्षीति अच्यं च सरक्षर्ववादः । अन्यथा कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति विप्रतिपत्तिरपेत्य सुतराम् । असेतना वेतनोत्पत्तिविवक्षम्तः सांख्यसक्तार्थवादेन द्वारा परास्ताः । स्वयं स्वस्त्रम्यारोहणवद्संगतं कर्त्त्वाः प्रहृतेः स्वज्ञात्रीस्वमिति सांख्यीया युक्तिः ।

अद्वैतवादे प्रहृतिपुरुषतस्य एकरूपत्वेन गृहीते भावया च पिण्डं ब्रह्माण्डं च प्रकल्प्य स्वाभिमतं मतं स्थापितम् । यथा चोक्तं—

‘कर्त्तृतन्त्रं भवेत् कर्म कर्मतन्त्रं तु भावुभ्यम् ।

प्रमाणतन्त्रं विज्ञानं मायातन्त्रमिदं जगदिति ।

सांख्यरपि प्रहृतिं विविष्य तद्विकृतिरूपमनोऽुद्याहंकारपदार्थाः प्रकृतेरवयवा गुणा वा वर्तन्ते इति तेभ्यः परः पुरुषोऽस्तीति स्वमतं स्थापितम् । उक्तं ज्ञायि हैः—

“कार्यकारणकर्त्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रहृतिरुच्यते ।

पुरुषः सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते” इति । गी० ३३, २०

बीद्धाः काणादाश्च परमाणुभ्यो जगदेतन्मन्वानाः परमाणुसेयोजविद्वांशक्तिं रुपापवितुं न पारयन्ति इति तेषामारंभवादं स्थगयितुं तद्विकृतिं प्रहृतम् । सांख्यास्तु परमाणुरूपावयवभेदाभाववत्ती प्रहृतिः, प्रधाना, गुणक्षेपिणी, बहुधानका, प्रसाधार्थिणी चास्तीति समान्याय सर्गरचनैकमिसर्गां तां सिद्धान्तयमिति । अद्वैतिनां सगुणसृष्टैं यावदेवैतस्य सरक्षर्ववादस्योपयोगो मतः । निर्गुणात् सगुणीरपतो तु हैः अष्टनष्टनापटीयसी माया शरणीकृता ।

पूर्वमेकस्त्वैव मूलपदार्थस्य विकासाद् विविष्यगद्युक्तिकासोऽपीति अर्थात् प्रकल्प्य एवान्यकप्रहृतेविविष्यवक्त्सर्गां जायत इति सांख्यैः चास्तरो विवयः समुपन्यसः ।

वैसे, तें-भास्त्रे के गुणात्मक समिति से कार्य स्वातंत्र्यवादी भवनीति सांख्यानां नेतृत्वम् । अन्यथा नीराह दध्युदभवः किं न स्वातिति समाधारं हुःकं स्थापत् । कम्युके वासिति क्षत्रकार्येऽपीति सांख्यवादः । इत्येवाहृतवादिनामिक्ष्य ।

अहमकरिकादी प्रकृतिर्वर्थापीनिरुपप्रस्थक्षागोचरा म भेदति तथापि तस्याः आस्तिर्व सौहृदयेण नृन् हृष्म् । अमेकम्भरपदार्थावलोकनं प्रकृतेरमित्वमवधारयति ।

सार्वत्रिकादिवद्वयवा समुद्दिष्टा । काण्डादैः प्रत्येकपरमाणुस्वतम्न
स्वयम्भावाऽप्यविता निर्भाविता परमाणुर्वां तत्र परमाणुद्वयमध्ये केन पदार्थेन
स्वीकृतमिति क्षिप्तते प्रद्वनः ।

उर्कं तावदृतिवचनेन । ग्रहस्तिपुरुषयोहमयमेद्दशानं कैवल्यमिति सांख्याना-
मन्तिमःसिद्धान्तः । सर्वतुण्टस्त्वात्यन्तोकर्त्तात् त्रिगुणातीतावस्था पुरुषेण सम्यक्ते
इयं च कैवल्यायोपचयत् इति द्विक् ।

राजकुमारकौलेज
रायपुर
फाल्गुनवदि १३
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सोवनीनिर्दिष्टालुयादकः

मेधाकरणसीमा

अथ सांख्यसूत्राणि

अथ ग्रिविधदुर्लात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः १

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प्रात्याहिकश्चुत्रतीकारत्वत् तत्पतीकारत्वेष्टनात् पुरुषार्थत्वम् । ३

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१. भूतस्वादस्यन्तनिरुद्धानि सांख्यप्रबन्धसूत्राणि सपाठान्तरमेवं तात्त्वं विश्वाप्य विश्वतोमुखों सारवतीमाषां वाचमन्याद्याधारतितरां प्रसिद्धात्मविधि संक्षिप्तानि काण्डसांख्यसूत्रत्वेनोपनिषद्वानि करिपयानि सूत्राण्युपलक्ष्यन्ते तानि अथा निवेदयामः—

अथातस्तत्त्वे समाप्तः १. कथामि अहौ प्रकृतयः २. ओढशास्तु विकारः ३. पुरुषः ४. त्रैगुण्यम् ५. सञ्चरः प्रतिसञ्चरः ६. अध्यात्ममधिभूतमधिदैवतः ७. पञ्चाभिभुदयः ८. पञ्च कर्मयोनयः ९. पञ्च चायवः १०. पञ्चकर्मात्मानः ११. पञ्चर्याद अविद्या: १२. अष्टाविंशतित्र्या अशक्तिः १३. नवया तुष्टिः १४. अष्टशा रिदिः १५. दश मूलिकार्थाः १६. अनुप्रहः सर्गः १७. अनुर्देशविषयो भूतसर्गः १८. ग्रिविद्धो वक्तव्यः १९. ग्रिविद्धो मोक्षः २०. ग्रिविद्धं प्रमाणलक्षणः २१. एतस्तस्यव्याख्यात्वा कृतहृस्यः स्वात्म पुनर्जिविभेदं तुःस्मै-तुभूते २२. सम् ॥ २. निष्ठुत्त्वेष्टपि ३. प्रात्याहिकः ४. तत्पुरुषार्थत्वम् ५. 'तत्सद्भवेऽप्यवलक्ष्यन्तासम्भवाद्वेषः' 'संभवेऽपि सत्यासम्भवाद्वेषः' चाः सर्वात्मा, सर्वत्र च ६. अगपाचात् ७. स्वदेहो.

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१. 'शक्त्युद्गवाभिमवाभ्यां'. २. 'इदं सुत्रं विचित्रादिति'. ३. 'शुतिरस्ति स्ता-
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१. 'हि' शब्दसहितोऽपि वाढः २. एक भावमा ३. गर्भाधानादिक्षेत्रादः

४. आग्निकर्मसे सत्त्वधर्मविकासात्तिवर्तम् ५५. 'क' रहितोऽपि ६. उत्तरपोतात्तम्

७. पूर्वभावित्वमात्रेन, पूर्वभावित्वात्रेण या ८. 'क्षमाद'

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१. 'प्येत' २. अग्रिमः त्रावनन्तरमाये पाठः. ३. विलः. ४. 'हृति'
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 १०. 'क' रहितोऽपि पाठः. ११. संहातपरार्थत्वा.

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१. आक्ष्यारहितः पाठः. २. अन्वेषाम्. ३. आशैतुद्वारा॑ ४. पारम्पर्येऽप्युच्यते. ५. पूर्वभाविते॑. ६. द्वयोरेकतरहावेषान्यतरयोगः. ७. 'व' इति आदौ अपि॑; परिच्छिङ्गत्वात् वा. ८. 'व' रहितोऽपि॑. ९. 'तरां' इति चरितः॑. १०. कर्मणा॑. ११. उपादानायोगात्. १२. आ. १३. विमोक्षः १४. काम्या॑-कर्मणे॑. १५. मात्रं परं. १६. समत्वम्. १७. चाप्य, वासं वा. १८. साधकत्वम्. १९. 'त्रिविधं' रहितः पाठः, 'त्रिविधं प्रमाणं' रहितो वा. २०. आदौ॑ त्रिविधं प्रमाणं, इति॑ संयोज्य.

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६. 'मित्यन्ये. ७. अपरः; 'कमपरे. ८. प्रत्येकादृष्टे. ९. प्रपञ्चत्वाद्यभावश्च.

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१. स्थिरं. २. अप्यविद्येयं. ३. °विरोधात्. ४. ज्वास्फटिकयोरिव. ५. चित्तप्रसादाभावात्. ६. अयोव्यव्याभावात् योव्यव्याभावात् वेति पाठद्वयं. ७. आत्मविरोधात्. ८. विमुक्तो. ९. विमुक्तभोगो भवति.

पुरुषबहुत्यं व्यवस्थातः ४५

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१. उपाधिसिद्धिभेतत्सिद्धौ. २. द्वाभ्यामप्य. ३. कर्मकर्तृत्वविरोधः; कर्तृकर्मविरोधः. ४. ० व्यावृत्तो ५. तदुत्पत्तिः ६. निमित्तसंभवात् ७. तत्सिद्धिः ८. विमुक्तिश्रुतिः ९. भोगदेशकालादिलाभो १०. पूतिभावयोगात् ११. अद्वैषोद्भूतिवत् ।

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इति शम्

इति सांख्यसूत्राणि समाप्तानि ।

श्रीमदीश्वरकृष्णष्टुप्ताः

सांख्यकारिकाः

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नहिन्नलिङ्गिपूर्वक, मासश्रुतिरासवचनं च ॥ ५ ॥
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 एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकौशित् ॥ २४ ॥
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 भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥
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 बाद्या विषयोऽस्मात् पञ्च, नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः ॥ ५० ॥
 ऊः शब्दोऽध्ययनं द्रुःखविधातास्यः सुखप्राप्तिः ।
 द्वान् च सिद्धयोऽष्टां सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्गुष्ठाविधिः ॥ ५१ ॥
 न विना भावेन्द्रियं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
 लिङ्गाग्न्यो भावाग्न्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवन्ते सर्वाः ॥ ५२ ॥
 अष्टविकल्यो द्वयस्तर्यव्यवोनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।
 मानुष्यश्चविधिः समायतोऽयं त्रिधामर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥
 उत्तर्वं सर्वविश्वालस्तमोविश्वालश्च मूलतः मर्गः ।
 मध्ये रजोविश्वालो विश्वादिस्तमवर्देन्नः ॥ ५४ ॥
 नक्र जहामरणकृतं द्रुःखं प्राप्नोति वेतनः पुरुषः ।
 लिङ्गाग्निदेहोः, सप्तस्माद् द्रुःखं स्वभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृता भवदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
 प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आश्रमः ॥ ५६ ॥
 वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रभुत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
 पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥
 औरसुक्षयनिवृत्यार्थं यथा कियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
 पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्रूप्यक्षम् ॥ ५८ ॥
 रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
 पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाशय विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥
 नानाविधैरुपर्युपकारिष्यनुपकारिणः पुमः ।
 गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति ॥ ६० ॥
 प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
 या दृष्टस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥
 तस्माच्च बध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
 संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥
 रूपः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
 मैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोक्षयस्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥
 एवं तरवाभ्यासात्कास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
 अविष्यवादिगुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥
 तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।
 प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वस्यः ॥ ६५ ॥
 रङ्गस्य इत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमव्येका ।
 मति संयोगेऽपि तदोः प्रयोजनं नाम्नि सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥
 सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमयाद्यमाद्यमाद्यिनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
 तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्क्रमवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥
 प्राप्ते जारीरमेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
 ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥
 पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमविषयः समाख्यातम् ।
 स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाभिन्नन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

प्रत्ययविवरमद्यं सुनिरासुरवेऽनुकम्पया प्रदद्वा ।
 आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥
 शिष्यपरम्परयाऽगतमीधरकृप्योन चैतदार्थामिः ।
 मंक्षिसमार्थमतिना सम्यग्बिजाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥
 मप्तयां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य पष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
 आत्मायिकाचिरहिताः परवादविवरजिताश्राप्य ॥ ७२ ॥
 इति-श्रीमद्भारकृतीप्रणीताः सांख्यकारिकाः समाप्ताः ।

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